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Abstract 
Dehumanisation is a pervasive social phenomenon that has facilitated historical and 
modern examples of extreme violence, prejudice and discrimination. The perception 
that a person can be ‘less  human’ than another person is typically applied to social 
outgroup members who are attributed with fewer uniquely human capacities 
compared to ingroup members. A significant amount of developmental research has 
examined the origins of intergroup bias among young children, however, 
investigation into the development of our tendency to dehumanise others has been 
relatively neglected. This is despite the fact that dehumanisation is closely linked to 
children’s social cognitive understanding (e.g., mental state inference) and behaviour 
(e.g., prosociality). The aim of my doctoral studies was to investigate the 
developmental origins of this phenomenon. The results of the empirical work in 
Chapters 2 and 3 revealed that 6-year-olds perceive outgroup faces to be physically 
less human than ingroup faces and that even younger children (5-year-olds) are less 
likely to reference the mental states of individuals belonging to a different group. 
The final experimental chapter (Chapter 4) explored the effects of encouraging 
children to mentalise about the behaviour of a perceived outgroup and showed that 
this technique is sufficient to increase empathic helping towards an outgroup 
member in need. The implications of this research for the nature of dehumanisation 
in development, as well as for children’s understanding of human and non-human 
agents, are discussed. Ultimately, further inquiry into how dehumanising biases 
emerge, and are potentially learnt, could contribute to strategies focused on 
improving intergroup relations.         
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Chapter 1: General Thesis Introduction 
The ability to recognise and to reason about the minds of our fellow human 
beings is essential to social functioning (Baillargeon et al., 2013; Dennett, 1996; 
Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Tomasello, 1995; Woodward, Sommerville, & 
Guajardo, 2001). These skills appear early in development, such that even young 
infants display sensitivity to the social and mental agency of others (Carpenter, 
Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Johnson, 2000; Johnson, 2003). Yet, despite this initial 
understanding, social psychologists have demonstrated that there are situations in 
which adults deny the mental life, and in general the humanity, of other people. For 
example, outgroup members are typically perceived as having fewer uniquely human 
traits and mental state faculties (e.g., intelligence, culture, complex emotional 
experiences) compared to ingroup members (Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014; Leyens et al., 2001). This phenomenon is known as 
‘dehumanisation’. Dehumanisation lies at the root of harmful social problems 
ranging from genocidal atrocities and extreme intergroup violence (Bandura, 
Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Leidner, 
Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Tirrell, 2012) to more everyday examples of 
prejudice and discrimination (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Čehajić, Brown, & 
González, 2009). Given these implications for the development of social cognition 
and behaviour, it is quite surprising that the psychological origins of this 
phenomenon have received very little research attention to date. 
The purpose of my doctoral studies is to investigate dehumanising biases in 
young children. I aim to contribute to the small body of work on this topic and to 
provide a clearer picture of when children first begin to selectively attribute 
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humanness to social group members. In addition, I wish to explore the potential link 
between children’s mental state understanding and dehumanisation by assessing 
whether they are more likely to spontaneously refer to the mind of ingroup members 
relative to outgroup members. I ultimately hope that this work can inform 
interventions to combat the negative consequences of this phenomenon and to 
encourage positive group relations. 
Dehumanisation 
Before delving into the relevant developmental literature, it is important that I 
first outline how dehumanisation has been defined in psychological research with 
adults. Although this phenomenon is observed in other contexts, for example, in the 
objectification of females in the media (Loughnan et al., 2010; Vaes, Paladino, & 
Puvia, 2011), the treatment of medical patients (Haque & Waytz, 2012; Vaes & 
Muratore, 2013) and even in the perception of the self (Bastian et al., 2013; Haslam, 
Bain, Douge, Lee, & Bastian, 2005), it is generally thought of as the denial of 
humanness to social outgroup members relative to ingroup members (Allport, 1954; 
Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007). Psychological theories tend to 
converge on the intergroup nature of dehumanisation; however, they differ 
somewhat with regards to the key features of this bias.  
Early Psychological Perspectives 
Social psychologists were originally interested in dehumanisation as a 
psychological mechanism to explain mass violence carried out in times of conflict 
(Bar-Tal, 1989; Schwartz & Struch, 1989; Staub, 1989; Tajfel, 1981). The majority 
of theorists focused on how the blatant act of dehumanising a person, or an entire 
group, weakens moral inhibitions (Bandura, 1991, 1999; Kelman, 1973) and thus 
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excludes them from moral concern (Opotow, 1990), allowing for their cruel 
treatment with little to no distress on part of the perpetrators. Some prime examples 
of this process include the likening of Jews to vermin in Nazi propaganda campaigns 
(Bytwerk, 1983), the comparisons between the Tutsi social class and ‘cockroaches’ 
in the lead up to the Rwandan genocide (Kellow & Steeves, 1998; Tirrell, 2012) and 
the categorisation of Black people as ‘savages’ during the slave trade in the colonial 
period (Jahoda, 1999). In these and similar cases, brutal actions were deemed to be 
justifiable because the eradication and/or oppression of marginalised groups were 
beneficial for society (Smith, 2012).   
The first experimental study illustrating the behavioural effects of 
dehumanisation was carried out in support of Albert Bandura’s (1991, 1999) theory 
of moral disengagement. Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson (1975) showed that 
participants who heard a dehumanising description of a novel group (e.g., 
‘animalistic’ and ‘rotten’) punished this group more for making mistakes (through 
the apparent administration of electric shocks) than when the recipients were 
characterised in more human terms (e.g., ‘perceptive’ and ‘understanding’). 
In contrast to these explicit, absolute denials of humanness, more recent 
psychological theories have paid attention to the implicit aspects of dehumanisation 
in society more broadly. The most influential of these accounts take an attribute-
based approach, as opposed to the metaphor-based approach in which outgroup 
members are directly compared to non-human categories (see above and Goff, 
Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). For this perspective, empirical studies 
investigate and identify the traits considered to be uniquely human and then ask 
adults to distribute these characteristics among social groups.  
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Infrahumanisation 
Leyens and colleagues (2000, 2001) were the first to operationalise the more 
subtle and relative way we ascribe humanness to others in the absence of intergroup 
tension. They assume that we reserve the full human ‘essence’ for ingroup members 
in the form of traits that distinguish humans and animals, namely intelligence, 
language, reasoning and emotions. This assumption derives from essentialist beliefs 
about social group categories in which we attribute members of a certain category 
with an underlying quality that determines their nature (Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 
1995). Therefore, outgroup members are perceived to be inherently less human or to 
possess an ‘infra-human’ essence. Empirically, these theorists concentrated on the 
distribution of a type of mental state, i.e., basic (primary) and uniquely human 
(secondary) emotions. They showed that basic emotions (e.g., sadness, happiness, 
fear) - thought to be biologically-driven and shared with animals (Ekman, 1992) - are 
differentiated from uniquely human emotions (e.g., remorse, hope, nostalgia) - which 
represent a more complex depiction of human interaction (Kemper, 1987) - in lay 
conceptions of humanness (Demoulin et al., 2004).  
Subsequent studies revealed that ingroup members are judged to experience 
significantly more positive and negative secondary emotions compared to primary 
emotions (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007; Paladino et al., 2002). In 
comparison, there are no significant differences in the type of emotions attributed to 
members of a perceived outgroup. This effect was coined outgroup 
‘infrahumanisation’ and has been connected to an array of problematic behavioural 
outcomes, largely outside the domain of conflict and violence (Vaes, Paladino, 
Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003), such as less empathy for and less willingness 
to help outgroup members in crisis (Čehajić et al., 2009; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 
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2007), fewer instances of intergroup forgiveness (Tam et al., 2007) and reduced 
perspective taking (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004). Furthermore, researchers have 
identified potential moderators of this bias. Increased support for nationalistic and 
conservative ideals (DeLuca-McLean & Castano, 2009; Viki & Calitri, 2008), as 
well as less knowledge of, low perceived similarity and less contact with outgroups 
(Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007; Rodríguez Pérez, Delgado Rodríguez, Betancor 
Rodríguez, Leyens, & Vaes, 2011), predict greater levels of infrahumanisation.  
The Dual Model of Humanness 
Haslam (2006) developed a theory that also focuses on how adults 
characterise humanity and assign these traits to themselves and to other people 
(Haslam et al., 2005). However, he proposes that we conceptualise humanness along 
two dimensions: one based on the comparison between human and animals (uniquely 
human; similar to infrahumanisation) and another based on the comparison between 
humans and automata (human nature; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). The denial of 
essential, uniquely human traits (e.g., rationality, culture) is termed ‘animalistic 
dehumanisation’ and associated with feelings of disgust. The denial of core, human 
nature traits (e.g., individuality, interpersonal warmth) is termed ‘mechanistic 
dehumanisation’ and generally promotes psychological distance. Empirical findings 
have reflected these two senses of humanness - the attribution of uniquely human 
and human nature qualities are seen to be uncorrelated (Haslam et al., 2005) and this 
distinction is observed across cultures (Bain, Vaes, Kashima, Haslam, & Guan, 
2011; Martinez, Rodriguez-Bailon, & Moya, 2012). Interestingly, adults attribute 
more positive and negative uniquely human traits (e.g., polite, disorganised) to 
ingroup members than to outgroup members but only think of their ingroup as higher 
in negative human nature terms (e.g. insecure, jealous; Koval, Laham, Haslam, 
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Bastian, & Whelan, 2011). The authors argue this finding represents a group 
protective function whereby emphasising the flaws of ingroup members make them 
‘only human’. This is an interesting interpretation but further study is needed to 
explore why valence seems to matter in the attribution of qualities related to 
mechanistic dehumanisation.  
Unlike Leyens (2001) infrahumanisation model (principally related to less 
severe outcomes for intergroup behaviour), Haslam’s (2006) theory proposes a 
continuum of behavioural consequences that range from very dangerous tendencies 
to more everyday discrimination. For example, adults who were exposed to low 
uniquely human and human nature descriptors of Muslims were more likely to report 
a necessity to torture Muslim prisoners of war (Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013) and 
quicker associations between female images and both animal- and object-related 
terms predicted men’s proclivity to sexually harass women  (Rudman & Mescher, 
2012).. In addition, both animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation have been 
correlated with lower levels of outgroup helping (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, 
Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014), and outgroup praise (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, 
& Koval, 2011).  
The Stereotype Content Model 
 The infrahumanisation (Leyens et al., 2000, 2001) and the dual model 
(Haslam, 2006) theories of dehumanisation imply that the attribution of fewer mental 
states to outgroup members is an important feature of this harmful phenomenon. In 
their research on the neural bases of dehumanisation, Harris and Fiske (2009, 2011) 
exclusively define this bias as a failure to consider the mind of another person. Their 
work stems from the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) 
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within which group members are evaluated on their perceived warmth and 
competence. Ingroup members are judged to be both likeable and highly competent 
whereas members of ostracised outgroups (e.g., homeless people, drug addicts) are 
generally disliked and deemed lower in educational and/or economic status. Hence, 
these outgroups are likely to be dehumanised. 
 Potentially supporting this idea, neuroscientific data have demonstrated that 
adult participants display less activity in brain regions associated with ‘mentalising’ 
(i.e., medial prefrontal cortex; Frith & Frith, 2006) and increased activation in 
disgust-related areas (e.g., insula; Wicker et al., 2003) when viewing extreme 
outgroup members. Moreover, they used fewer mental state verbs when asked to 
describe a day in the life of a, for example, homeless person (Harris & Fiske, 2006). 
Although the authors have not directly associated differences in brain activity with 
adverse intergroup behaviour, Harris and Fiske (2011) suggest that this cognitive 
failure could contribute to the inhumane treatment of others (also see Fiske, 2009).  
Mind Perception 
Very closely related to this approach, another body of research argues that 
how we perceive the minds of other people is inextricably linked to the concept of 
dehumanisation (Waytz, Epley, & Cacioppo, 2010; Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 
2010). The two methods through which we can deny the mind, or ‘dementalise’, 
others are very similar to Haslam’s two aspects of humanness (Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014; Waytz et al., 2010). Specifically, Gray and colleagues (2007) found that the 
perception of agency, or mental state abilities that distinguish humans from animals 
(e.g., to plan, to think) and experience, or emotional capacities that distinguish 
humans from inanimate entities (e.g., to feel pain, to have a personality) are involved 
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in mind detection. These theorists further elucidate the relation between mind 
perception and dehumanisation when considering the impact of attributing someone 
with less of a mind on moral decision-making. For instance, if we do not perceive 
another person as having a mind that experiences distress, then we will not proceed 
to empathise with their distress (Bruneau, Cikara, & Saxe, 2015) and to include them 
within the realm of moral concern (Waytz et al., 2010). 
Empirically, adults perceive a liked target to be more mindful compared to a 
disliked target (Kozak, Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). More related to intergroup bias, 
Hackel, Looser, and Van Bavel (2014) suggest that ingroup members are attributed 
with mental states more readily than are outgroup members. Across two studies, they 
presented participants with a series of doll-human face morphs ranging from 0% 
animate to 100% animate and manipulated their belief about whether the morphs 
were based on members of their own group or another group. The results revealed 
that ingroup faces were perceived to have a mind at a lower threshold on the 
continuum (approx. 60%) than outgroup faces (approx. 70%).This effect was later 
replicated with participants from both Eastern and Western cultures (Krumhuber, 
Swiderska, Tsankova, Kamble, & Kappas, 2015).  
Summary 
Taken together, the definition of dehumanisation in social psychological 
research seems to be a complex and multifaceted one. However, there are a few 
critical features that overlap across different accounts. The denial of mental state and 
other human-like characteristics to outgroup members and outgroup derogation 
(dislike and perceived lower status) are commonly associated with dehumanising 
perceptions. Reasoning about social groups in an essentialist manner also seems to 
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be an important component in the process of dehumanisation. These social and 
psychological factors have also been studied in a distinct body of literature 
investigating the development of social and intergroup cognition in children.  
The Development of Social Cognition 
Some of the definitions outlined above suggest that, in order to dehumanise, 
one must first understand what ‘humanness’ entails to some extent (Bain et al., 2011; 
Castano et al., 2009; Demoulin et al., 2004). A significant research effort in 
developmental psychology has been dedicated to identifying when the recognition 
and understanding of human action and thought emerges in development (Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Leslie, 1994; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988) and 
what this means for children’s social (Chalik, Rivera, & Rhodes, 2014; Jenkins & 
Astington, 2000) and cognitive (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Ozonoff, 
Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) competence.  
Agency Understanding 
Researchers interested in the perception of agency have pinpointed certain 
features that may help infants to recognise potential interaction partners: whether an 
agent has a face or eyes, whether it engages in a contingent, social interaction and 
whether it appears to move in a self-propelled way (Beier & Carey, 2014; Johnson, 
2000; Premack, 1990). For example, infants follow the gaze of a motorised object 
significantly more often (Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998) and make social 
evaluations about the apparent behaviour of moving shapes (Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; 
Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Powell & Spelke, 2013) when they possess some of 
these human-like properties.  
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Developmental research has often relied on these anthropomorphic 
tendencies to shed light on the development of children’s social cognitive abilities. 
Five-year-olds, but not younger children, perceive social intent in the seemingly 
purposeful interaction between animated shapes (see Heider & Simmel, 1944, for 
comparable work with adults) and are able to identify which shape  is ‘scared’ or 
‘being mean’ (Springer, Meier, & Berry, 1996). Similar stimuli were used to 
examine mentalising deficits in autism and found that autistic children produced 
fewer and less appropriate mental state descriptions of these animations compared to 
matched controls (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000). Research into when children first 
begin to mentalise about the behaviour of others has been especially prolific within 
the developmental literature and could have particularly interesting implications for 
the concept of dehumanisation.  
Mental State Understanding 
Our ‘theory of mind’ refers to the capacity to overcome an egocentric way of 
thinking and to reason about the mental states (i.e., intentions, desires, beliefs, 
emotions) of other people (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 1990). Previous 
research has shown that young infants demonstrate a form of intention 
understanding; for example, 7-month-olds are more surprised by collision events that 
involve two moving people compared to two moving objects (i.e., a box and cylinder 
mounted on wheels), perhaps expecting that humans would try to avoid colliding 
with one another (Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). Other research has looked 
at infants’ understanding of goal-directed actions in more depth (Woodward, 1998). 
Five-, 6-, and 9-month-olds were habituated to an actor reaching for one of two toys 
presented at a distance. At test, the position of these toys was switched and the actor 
reached for the same toy (but with a different motion pattern) in one trial and for the 
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alternate toy (but with the same motion pattern as before) in another trial. The results 
revealed that the older infants looked longer during trials where the actor chose a 
different toy (and not when they moved in a different direction). Importantly, 
looking times were not affected when a metal rod engaged in the same movement 
patterns during test trials. A similar experiment with 18-month-olds found that they 
were able to correctly interpret an adult’s intended action through observation of 
their failed attempts (Meltzoff, 1995) but that they did not produce the target acts 
when the disrupted actions were performed by a set of mechanical arms. Thus, 
infants seem to infer that human motion, and not object motion, is driven by internal 
goals and intentions (Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1995). 
Further work has suggested that older infants can discriminate between 
intentional and accidental actions (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998) and can 
predict someone’s desired food choice based on their prior reactions (Repacholi & 
Gopnik, 1997). The exact emergence of belief understanding is in contention 
however (Heyes, 2014; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Traditional tests have 
focused on children’s ability to indicate the false belief (i.e., a belief about the world 
that differs from the reality of the situation) of another individual (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). For example, in the famous Sally Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985), children view a puppet putting an object into one of two locations (e.g., 
box A) and then observe the experimenter changing the location of the object (e.g., 
by putting it in box B) in the puppet’s ‘absence’. Children’s task is to specify the 
location where they think the puppet would look for the object when it returns (i.e., 
box A). The results of this paradigm have demonstrated that typically developing 
children are reliably able to adopt the mental perspective of this agent from around 
the age of 4. However, more recent work employing less demanding, nonverbal 
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versions of this test (e.g., based on looking time, active helping measures; 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, 
Senju, & Csibra, 2007) have argued that young infants demonstrate this ability. 
Another aspect to this line of work is examining how individual differences 
in theory of mind proficiency are associated with children’s socio-cognitive skills. 
As alluded to above, a persistent difficulty in understanding the mental states of 
others is considered a central characteristic in autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and 
leads to low quality and confusing social interactions for these individuals (Baron-
Cohen, 2000; Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, & Schultz, 2012). For typically 
developing children, their performance on theory of mind assessments predicts the 
nature of peer play (Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000), how they evaluate moral actions 
(Baird & Astington, 2004) and their level of executive function (Carlson et al., 2002) 
among other social cognitive outcomes (Moore & Frye, 1991). Other research with 
slightly older children has shown that second-order false belief understanding (i.e., 
Person X wrongly believes that Person Y believes the object is in location A; Perner 
& Wimmer, 1985) plays a role in coordinating with peers (Grueneisen, Wyman, & 
Tomasello, 2015) and in the correct interpretation of situational evidence(Astington, 
Pelletier, & Homer, 2002). Furthermore, their attribution of second-order ignorance 
(i.e., Person A does not know what Person B knows) helps them to distinguish 
between a lie and a joke (Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995).  
  Emotion understanding 
Since a person’s mental states also encompass his or her emotional 
experiences (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Hughes & Dunn, 1998) and emotion 
perception is a common measure in dehumanisation research (Leyens et al., 2000; 
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Paladino et al., 2002), it is worthwhile to mention when the understanding of 
primary and secondary emotions may be observed in development. Past work has 
suggested that the comprehension of basic emotions appear early in life (Sroufe, 
1983) - very young infants discriminate between happy and sad vocal and/or facial 
expressions (Field & Walden, 1982; Vaillant-Molina, Bahrick, & Flom, 2013) and 
attend more to the gaze of fearful faces, than to neutral or happy faces, when 
learning about novel objects (Hoehl, Wiese, & Striano, 2008). From around the age 
of 5 or 6, children can make inferences about complex socially-driven emotions like 
remorse and guilt (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2011) and are able to verbalise 
their experience of embarrassment (Bennett, 1989; Buss, Iscoe, & Buss, 1979) and 
pride (Seidner, Stipek, & Feshbach, 1988) to some degree. Children’s understanding 
of secondary emotions is thought to continually develop at a significant rate 
throughout middle childhood (Harris, Olthof, Terwogt, & Hardman, 1987; Tangney 
& Fischer, 1995). 
Summary 
It is clear that, from early in development, children are sensitive to and are 
able to reason about various features of humanity. Developmental research has 
concentrated on when these capacities emerge (Baillargeon et al., 2013; Flavell, 
Green, & Flavell, 1990; Johnson, 2000), as well as causes and consequences of these 
skills (Astington, 2001; Heyes, 2014). What are less clear are the social 
circumstances in which children may deny the humanness of other people.   
The Development of Intergroup Cognition 
Investigation into the origins of intergroup prejudice has provided empirical 
evidence to suggest that young children might perceive outgroup members as less 
 26 
 
human than ingroup members. More specifically, these studies have shown that 
children demonstrate some of the social biases previously associated with 
dehumanisation in adults, such as strong preferences for their own versus other 
groups (Dunham & Emory, 2014), essentialist beliefs about social group members 
(Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012) and knowledge of the relative status of social 
classes (Liben, Bigler, & Krogh, 2001; Olson, Shutts, Kinzler, & Weisman, 2012).  
Explicit and Implicit Preference 
The psychological work examining the development of intergroup bias has 
primarily focused on children’s relative implicit and explicit preferences for group 
members (Dunham & Degner, 2010). It has revealed that, within Western societies at 
least, social categories based on gender, language and racial differences are 
particularly influential in the formation of children’s attitudes (Aboud, 1988; Hilliard 
& Liben, 2010; Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007; La Freniere, Strayer, & Gauthier, 
1984). In addition to these types of group membership, I will also discuss social 
divisions based on place of origin or nationality because they are highly relevant in 
the current social and political climate (Sanneh, 2016; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015) 
and therefore in my empirical chapters. 
Gender  
Children profess explicit liking for same-gender individuals from at least 2 
years of age (Martin & Ruble, 2004; Yee & Brown, 1994). This preference extends 
into how they reason about and engage with their social environment. In a set of 
experiments, Shutts, Banaji, and Spelke (2010) found that 3-year olds base their 
preferences for novel objects and activities on the gender (but not the race) of the 
endorser. Additionally, 3-year olds attend to the gender (but, again, not the race) of 
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other children when deciding who they should be friends with and who would share 
their social preferences (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013). Young children even 
demonstrate this positivity in an implicit way by responding faster to associations 
between photos of same-gender peers and positive words in a child-friendly version 
of the Implicit Association Task (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2015).  
Language 
Preferences for members of our own language group also emerge very early 
in development (Kinzler et al., 2007). Five- and 6-month-old infants preferentially 
attend to native language speakers, and older infants (both American and French) are 
more likely to accept toys from individuals who speak their own language. 
Relatedly, Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, and Carpenter (2013) observed that 14-month 
olds imitate the actions of a native speaker more faithfully than actions performed by 
a foreign language speaker. Five-year-old American children favour peers who speak 
in their native language or with their native accent compared to peers who speak in a 
foreign accent (i.e., English in a French accent; Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). These 
preferences are judged to be robust and can even sometimes override young 
children’s liking for other social groups – they prefer to affiliate with racial outgroup 
members who spoke in a native accent compared to the reverse (Kinzler, Shutts, 
DeJesus, & Spelke, 2009). 
Race 
Research has shown that 9-month-old infants orient towards own-race faces 
(Kelly et al., 2005) and by 3- to 4-years of age, young children can categorise people 
by race (Dunham, Stepanova, Dotsch, & Todorov, 2015). Even though Shutts et al. 
(2013) did not find that race influenced 3-year-olds’ social choices, 4-year-olds use 
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race to infer third-party relationships. From around the age of 5, children express 
social preference for members of their own racial group (Doyle & Aboud, 1995; 
Kinzler et al., 2009; Kircher & Furby, 1971) and 6-year-old children assign more 
positive traits to their racial ingroup at an implicit level (Baron & Banaji, 2006; 
Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2006). However, it is important to note that this 
developmental trend is mainly true for majority (largely White) race children; the 
emergence of ingroup preferences in children belonging to minority racial groups is 
not as straightforward (Margie, Killen, Sinno, & McGlothlin, 2005; Milner, 1973) 
and considerably influenced by cultural factors (for e.g., see Shutts, Kinzler, Katz, 
Tredoux, & Spelke, 2011). 
Nationality 
Nationality is a more complex social grouping because it can involve 
identifying with one or a culmination of social markers (e.g., national colours, 
cultural traditions, native accent/language, race; Barrett, 2007). For example, 
relevant research has illustrated how the recognition of this social category is a 
particularly dynamic process. When presented with the choice, both American and 
Korean 5- and 6-year-old children tended to categorise national ingroup members 
based on the language they spoke, regardless of the speaker’s race (DeJesus, Hwang, 
Dautel, & Kinzler, 2017a). Older children, in comparison, had a broader view of 
their national ingroup and their consideration of racial and linguistic cues differed 
between the two cultures. Therefore, it is not surprising that, unlike most of the other 
group divisions mentioned in this section, emergence of biased attitudes favouring 
one’s own national group varies significantly across sociocultural contexts (Bennett 
et al., 2004; Oppenheimer & Barrett, 2011). Children as young as 3 years of age can 
show explicit negativity towards national outgroups in countries where intergroup 
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conflict is prevalent (Bar-Tal, 1996; Povrzanović, 1997) compared to children living 
in more peaceful settings. Children in these contexts usually begin to reliably prefer 
and identify with their own country at about 6 or 7 years of age (Barrett, 2007). 
Ingroup positivity versus outgroup negativity 
Young children demonstrate robust preferences for ingroup members across 
multiple group dimensions, yet, this display of ingroup positivity may not be equated 
to having a negative view of the outgroup. There is evidence to suggest that ingroup 
positivity does appear somewhat earlier in development than outgroup derogation 
(Aboud, 2003; Benozio & Diesendruck, 2015; Brewer, 1999). Buttelmann and Böhm 
(2014) showed the potentially diverging development of ingroup love and outgroup 
hate in a minimal group paradigm. This type of group manipulation - based on 
relatively minimal  symbols of similarity (for e.g., the yellow vs. the green group)-  
is valuable for investigating the effects of mere categorisation on  young children’s 
evaluative responses (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011; Richter, Over, & Dunham, 
2016) and behaviour (Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013; 
Oostenbroek & Over, 2015; Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2015). Their 
findings revealed that 6-year-olds prevented their minimal ingroup from receiving 
negative items (e.g., a spider) and instead opted to distribute these items to a neutral 
party. Older children (i.e., 8-year-olds), however, gave significantly more of these 
undesirable items to the minimal outgroup.  
Researchers have provided various explanations for the possibly distinct 
developmental trajectories of these processes. Some have emphasised the 
evolutionary value of early attachment to the ingroup (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; 
Caporael, 1997) while others have focused on the role of learning in the emergence 
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of negative outgroup attitudes (Over, Eggleston, Bell, & Dunham, 2017). Meltzoff 
(2007, 2013) presents a theoretical perspective that highlights our early propensity to 
prefer people who are similar to us. Based on research with infants, he argues that 
early shared experiences with others (e.g., imitating a parent’s actions or expressions 
and vice versa) shapes ‘like me’ preferences which underlie the ingroup positivity 
observed in young children. 
Social Essentialism 
Essentialism was first investigated as an element of children’s folk 
psychological theories (Gelman & Legare, 2011; Hirschfeld, 1995). This research 
demonstrated an almost universal tendency to believe that the biological and social 
world is made up of ‘natural kinds’ that possess a fundamental hidden property 
which is determined from birth and is responsible for their observable traits 
(Gelman, 2004). The grouping of biological entities into different kinds is considered 
helpful for children’s learning. For example, knowing that one tiger is aggressive 
allows children to make similar inferences about seemingly harmless baby tigers 
(Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007) and those who have a slightly different appearance 
(Gelman & Legare, 2011) because they all retain a tiger ‘essence’. However, these 
essentialist beliefs become problematic when they are applied to social groups 
(Hirschfeld, 1996; Rhodes et al., 2012) and can facilitate stereotyping (Allport, 1954; 
Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Prentice & Miller, 2007), and perhaps even 
dehumanising biases (Leyens, 2009) in adults. 
More recent work has examined the developmental trajectory of social 
essentialism. In these studies, children make judgements about the generalisability of 
stereotypic characteristics, for example, whether every boy likes to play sports, and 
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if these traits are hereditary and stable, for example, whether the race of a baby will 
always match the race of the parent. By the age of 5, children are thought to 
essentialise about gender (Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009) and native language 
(Kinzler & Dautel, 2012) and the emergence of these beliefs seem to be prevalent 
across cultures (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). In contrast, the development and strength 
of essentialist beliefs about racial (Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Waxman, 2010), 
ethnic (Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010; Diesendruck & 
HaLevi, 2006) and religious (Chalik, Leslie, & Rhodes, 2017) groups relies on 
cultural influences. For instance, young children from more politically conservative 
backgrounds in the US are more likely to display a racial bias (Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009) and Israeli children in religious communities are more likely to use inductive 
reasoning when talking about Jew and Arab social categories compared to secular 
children (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009). 
Perceived Status 
The perception of dehumanised outgroups often co-occurs alongside the 
belief that outgroup members are inferior to the ingroup in some respect and/or 
constitute a lower social class (Capozza, Andrighetto, Di Bernardo, & Falvo, 2011; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006; Loughnan, Haslam, Sutton, & Spencer, 2014). Developmental 
work has shown that sensitivity to the hierarchical nature of society emerges early 
(Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). Three-year-olds 
associate a greater amount of wealth with higher status racial groups in certain 
cultures (Olson et al., 2012) and older children think novel occupations are more 
prestigious (e.g., more important and gain a higher wage) when they are portrayed by 
conventionally competent characters (i.e., White males; Bigler, Averhart, & Liben, 
2003; Liben et al., 2001). Moreover, across a variety of contexts, children tend to 
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favour members belonging to high status groups (Bigler et al., 2001; Horwitz, 
Shutts, & Olson, 2014; Newheiser & Olson, 2012; Shutts et al., 2011).  
Summary 
Overall, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest that young children are 
able to understand some of the important components of humanity and, in addition, 
exhibit many of the intergroup biases linked to outgroup dehumanisation in previous 
literature. I will now review the few recent studies that have begun to investigate this 
phenomenon in adolescents and children. Similar to work with adults (Haslam, 2006; 
Leyens et al., 2001), this small body of work has focused on the attribution of human 
characteristics to social in- and outgroup members. 
The Development of Dehumanisation 
Two different studies showed that adolescents, aged between 11 and 16 years 
of age, ‘infra-humanise’ outgroup members by specifying fewer uniquely human 
emotions (e.g., sympathy, hope) in the evaluation of peers who belong to a different 
school (Brown et al., 2007) and who support a different football team (Chas, 
Betancor, Rodríguez-Pérez, & Delgado, 2015) to them. Martin, Bennett, and Murray 
(2008) used an adapted version of this paradigm to examine the development of 
infrahumanisation in 6- to 7-year-old and 10- to 11-year-old Scottish children. In this 
study, children of both ages believed their national football team would experience 
secondary emotions (e.g., pride) more intensely than primary (e.g., anger) emotions 
but that the English football team would experience both types of emotion to a 
similar degree. Costello and Hodson (2014) also proposed that children judge 
outgroup members to be less human than ingroup members on this dimension across 
racial divisions. Their results revealed that 6- to 10-year-old White participants 
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thought Black children experience fewer complex emotions (e.g., guilt) and possess 
fewer uniquely human capacities in general (e.g., curiosity). Finally, Van Noorden, 
Haselager, Cillessen, and Bukowski (2014) developed a measure to assess both 
animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanisation towards friends and non-
friends in 7- to 12-year-olds. They found that ingroup peers were attributed with 
more human nature (e.g., sociability, friendliness) and uniquely human (e.g., 
humility, politeness) qualities and that outgroup peers were more likely to be 
dehumanised in an animalistic (i.e., denied uniquely human traits) rather than in a 
mechanistic fashion. Taken as a whole, this research implies children as young as 6 
years of age might dehumanise peer, racial and national outgroup members.  
Although these trait-based results are compelling, they are limited to some 
respect in explaining how dehumanising biases originate in development. It is not 
clear whether adults and young children conceive of humanity in the exact same 
way; for example, Betancor Rodriguez, Chas Villar, Rodriguez-Perez, and Delgado 
Rodriguez (2016) recently proposed that 11- and 12-year-olds categorise the 
respective humanness of emotional terms differently to adults. One of these 
differences was that, while adults believe secondary emotions to be a strong 
indicator of a person’s morality, children endorse basic emotions as signs of 
‘goodness’ or ‘badness’. Betancor Rodriguez et al. (2016) claim this particular 
deviation could be reflective of children’s developing sense of morality. Hence, 
previous findings on this topic should perhaps be interpreted with caution because 
they may not directly reflect children’s dehumanising perceptions. Furthermore, 
investigation into the developmental trajectory of dehumanisation and how it relates 
to other facets of children’s social and intergroup cognition has been somewhat 
neglected. 
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The Present Research Aims 
The first aim of my doctoral work was to take a step away from paradigms 
based on emotion and trait attribution and to develop a novel measure of humanness 
for use with young children. My first experimental chapter (Chapter 2) thus explores 
whether children perceive outgroup members to be less human than ingroup 
members in the context of face perception. In two studies, 5- and 6-year-olds were 
asked to rate the physical humanness of ambiguous doll-human faces (taken from 
Hackel et al., 2014) when they belonged to their gender in- and outgroup (Study 1) 
and to a geographically based in- and outgroup (Study 2). Potential age differences 
in this tendency and whether it was associated with children’s explicit preference for 
the social groups was also investigated.  
My next empirical chapter (Chapter 3) combines adult research on 
dehumanisation with developmental work on mental state understanding to 
investigate whether young children are biased in the way they mentalise about the 
behaviour of other people. I chose to focus on this specific feature of dehumanisation 
because potential biases in children’s mental state attribution could have direct 
implications for the nature of their theory of mind abilities. For this study, 5- and 6-
year-olds were asked to describe the actions of interacting geometric shapes 
(employed in research with autism; see Abell et al., 2000) and their belief about the 
group membership of these characters was manipulated (again, across gender and 
geographically based categories). The dependent measure was the quantity and 
diversity of mental state content in children’s descriptions.  
My final set of studies (Chapter 4) attempts to address the ultimate aim of the 
present research. Building on the results from Chapter 3, I examined the role of 
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mental state attribution in fostering positive intergroup behaviour (specifically for 
outcomes that are associated with dehumanisation) in a politically relevant context. 
To accomplish this, 5- and 6-year-olds were either encouraged to discuss the 
thoughts and feelings or the actions of an immigrant group and their perception of a 
novel group member’s emotions was measured, as well as the extent to which they 
helped another group member in an empathic-based situation.  
I decided to recruit 5- and 6-year-old children in my empirical research for 
multiple reasons. First, by this age, children can explicitly reason about the social 
behaviour of agents (Springer et al., 1996) and pass standard theory of mind tests 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wellman, 2002). Second, and most importantly for 
Chapter 3, children in this age range correctly use mental state terms when referring 
to people’s minds (Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983) and frequently do so in 
conversation (Frith & Frith, 2003). Finally, 5- and 6–year-olds exhibit the intergroup 
biases previously linked to dehumanisation: they demonstrate implicit and explicit 
preferences for members of their own groups (Banaji, Baron, Dunham, & Olson, 
2008; Kinzler et al., 2009; Patterson & Bigler, 2006), essentialise about certain social 
categories (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009) 
and are sensitive to the status of social group members (Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). 
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Chapter 2: Children’s Perception of Humanness 
Reference:  
McLoughlin, N., Tipper, S. P., & Over, H. (2017). Young children perceive less 
humanness in outgroup faces. Developmental Science. doi:10.1111/desc.12539
1
  
Abstract 
We investigated when young children first dehumanise outgroups. Across two 
studies, 5- and 6-year-olds were asked to rate how human they thought a set of 
ambiguous doll-human face morphs were. We manipulated whether these faces 
belonged to their gender in- or gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically 
based in- or outgroup (Study 2). In both studies, the tendency to perceive outgroup 
faces as less human relative to ingroup faces increased with age. Explicit ingroup 
preference, in contrast, was present even in the youngest children and remained 
stable across age.  These results demonstrate that children dehumanise outgroup 
members from relatively early in development and suggest that the tendency to do so 
may be partially distinguishable from intergroup preference. This research has 
important implications for our understanding of children’s perception of humanness 
and the origins of intergroup bias. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The author, Niamh McLoughlin, designed the experiment, collected the data, 
analysed the results, and wrote the article under the supervision of Dr. Harriet Over 
and Prof. Steven Tipper. 
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Introduction 
In order to navigate the social world, it is essential to be able to recognise and 
engage with potential interaction partners (Baillargeon et al., 2013; Over, 2016; 
Tomasello, 1995). A great deal of developmental research has focused on when 
children are first able to identify socially relevant agents (Johnson, 2000; Meltzoff, 
1995; Woodward et al., 1993) and attribute human-like capacities to those agents 
(Carpenter et al., 1998; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). 
However, a body of work from social psychology suggests that we do not always 
consider the humanity of others.  Adults tend to ‘dehumanise’, or deny full 
humanness to, outgroups (Bandura, 1991, 1999; Loughnan et al., 2014; Vaes, 
Leyens, Paladino, & Miranda, 2012; Viki & Calitri, 2008). Outgroup members are 
perceived to have fewer uniquely human qualities, such as rationality, openness and 
cultured beliefs (Haslam, 2006), and are also attributed with fewer second-order 
emotions, such as compassion and remorse (Leyens et al., 2000; Leyens et al., 2001) 
than ingroup members. Leyens and colleagues found that this differential attribution 
of emotion was present across a series of studies and termed the effect 
‘infrahumanisation’. More generally, outgroup members are thought to have less of a 
mind (Hackel et al., 2014; Harris & Fiske, 2006, 2011; Krumhuber et al., 2015). 
Dehumanisation has been linked to acts of prejudice (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; 
Rudman & Mescher, 2012; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013) and neglect (Čehajić et 
al., 2009; Cuddy et al., 2007) observed among social groups. The developmental 
origins of this phenomenon are thus important for our understanding of intergroup 
relations. 
To date, there has been relatively little work on dehumanisation in 
development. Certainly, we know from previous research that intergroup biases are 
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present from a young age (Aboud, 1988; Dunham et al., 2011; Kinzler et al., 2009; 
Patterson & Bigler, 2006). Research has shown that young children reliably exhibit 
both implicit and explicit preference for individuals of the same gender (Dunham et 
al., 2015; Yee & Brown, 1994). For example, Shutts et al. (2010) found that 3-year-
olds prefer novel objects and activities that are endorsed by same-gender peers. 
Gender is also the first social category that children think about in an essentialised 
manner, in that they believe group members share an underlying quality or ‘essence’ 
that defines their nature (Gelman, 2003; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). From around the 
age of 5, children prefer and assign more positive traits to their own racial group 
(Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). Somewhat older children (i.e. 6-
year-olds) show implicit own-race preference, at a level comparable to that seen in 
adults, as measured by a child friendly version of the Implicit Association Task 
(Baron & Banaji, 2006). With regards to national groups, children begin to explicitly 
identify with and prefer their own country from around the age of 6 or 7 (Barrett, 
2007). The emergence of these attitudes, however, varies across sociocultural 
settings and can be seen earlier in countries that have recently experienced or are 
currently experiencing intergroup conflict (Oppenheimer & Hakvoort, 2003; 
Teichman, 2001).  
Only a handful of studies have considered the origins of dehumanisation. 
These studies have tended to focus on emotion and trait attribution. Van Noorden et 
al. (2014) asked 7- to 12-year-old children to judge if their friends versus their non-
friends possessed human-like qualities such as humility, trustworthiness and 
sociability. In general, children thought of friends as having more of these traits. A 
related finding looking specifically at social groups found that White children, aged 
6 to 10 years, attributed fewer human traits (e.g., curiosity, creativity) and fewer 
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second-order emotions (e.g., embarrassment, love, guilt) to Black targets than to 
White targets (Costello & Hodson, 2014). Finally, Martin et al. (2008) showed how 
6- to 11-year-old Scottish children estimated that their national football team would 
experience second-order emotions (e.g., pride, disappointment) more intensely than 
would the English football team. Although these results regarding trait and emotion 
attribution are suggestive, they need to be complemented by more extensive research 
investigating which qualities young children actually associate with humanness (for 
e.g., see  Betancor Rodriguez et al., 2016, with older children). 
To our knowledge, no studies have yet explored the developmental origins of 
dehumanisation in relation to social perception. We therefore examined whether 
young children perceive outgroup members to be less human. To investigate this 
question, we focused on face perception since previous research has demonstrated 
that young children are able to perceive social qualities in faces. Cogsdill, Todorov, 
Spelke, and Banaji (2014) found that 5- and 6-year-olds were at adult levels of 
reliability when judging faces for trustworthiness, dominance and competence and, 
in addition, Song, Over, and Carpenter (2016) found that similarly aged children are 
able to discriminate between subtly different facial expressions (i.e., real vs. fake 
smiles). Other research has suggested that group membership influences how young 
children perceive faces. At least from the age of 5, and perhaps even considerably 
younger (Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006), children are better at recognising 
the faces of ingroup members, including same-race (Feinman & Entwisle, 1976; 
Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Moore, 2003) and same-age (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005) 
individuals. In terms of social group bias, 3- and 4-year-old White children are more 
likely to categorise racially ambiguous faces as outgroup members when they 
possess a negative expression (Dunham, Chen, & Banaji, 2013). 
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We investigated whether children perceive less humanness in outgroup faces 
relative to ingroup faces. In order to do this, we adapted a paradigm from the adult 
literature to make it suitable for developmental research. Hackel et al. (2014) 
presented a set of face stimuli that were generated by morphing doll faces with 
human faces to create a series of continua that ranged from 0% animate (i.e., doll 
face) to 100% animate (i.e., human face). In two studies, Hackel et al. (2014) 
manipulated the group to which these faces belonged by informing participants that 
some of the faces were based on morphs developed from ingroup members and 
others were based on morphs developed from outgroup members. Participants were 
then asked to rate the extent to which each face looked like it ‘had a mind’ on a 7-
point scale. Results indicated that the threshold for perceiving a mind in a face was 
lower for ingroup members, when fewer human cues were present, (at approx. 60% 
increment along the continuum) compared to the threshold for outgroup faces (at 
approx. 70% increment along the continuum).  In other words, ingroup faces were 
humanised, and perceived to have a mind, more readily than were outgroup faces.  
We modified this paradigm in the following ways.  First, we substantially 
reduced the number of trials by identifying the most ambiguous doll-human morph 
from each face continuum in a pretest study with adults. This allowed us to have 
eight test trials rather than the 110 that were presented to adult participants. Second, 
we modified the test question and, instead, asked participants how human the face 
appeared. Our final modification involved the way in which children gave their 
responses. We asked them to estimate how human each face looked on a 4-point 
scale ranging from ‘not at all human’ to ‘completely human’. We predicted that 
children would judge the morph faces to be less human when they belonged to their 
outgroup than when they belonged to their ingroup.  
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We chose to examine this question with 5- and 6-year-old children because 
we know that they are able to extract social meaning from faces (Cogsdill et al., 
2014), that social categories influence how they process faces (Dunham et al., 2013; 
Pezdek et al., 2003) and that they show reliable preferences for their own groups 
(Dunham & Emory, 2014; Kinzler et al., 2007; La Freniere et al., 1984). Lastly, by 
including 5-year-olds, we tested dehumanisation in a somewhat younger age group 
than other research on this topic. 
Study 1 
We tested the extent to which children perceive relatively less humanness 
when evaluating other-gender faces. We chose gender because it is a particularly 
salient category for young children when thinking about and engaging with their 
social environment (Grace, David, & Ryan, 2008; Martin & Ruble, 2004; Shutts et 
al., 2013).  In an informal pilot study with 32 5- to 7-year-olds (18 boys, Mage = 6;5, 
age range = 5;7-7;5), we presented the ambiguous doll-human faces selected in the 
pretest study with adults (see Figure 1) and found that children, on average, 
perceived less humanness in the faces that belonged to their gender outgroup than in 
the faces that characterised their own gender (t (31) = 2.23, p =.033, d = .39). 
Our objective for Study 1 was to replicate this preliminary finding with a 
larger sample. Furthermore, we systematically explored any effect of age by testing 
an equal number of 5-year-olds and 6-year-olds. Children’s explicit preference for 
the groups was also measured as a manipulation check. All of the measures that were 
administered across both studies are reported in full. 
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two 5-year-olds (16 boys, Mage = 5;7,  age range = 5;0-5;11) and 32 
6-year-olds (16 boys, Mage = 6;6,  age range = 6;0-6;11) were recruited from a local 
school and a museum to take part in the study. Six more children also participated 
but were excluded from analysis due to language and hearing difficulties (n = 1), 
making two or more errors during initial training on the response scale (n = 3, see 
below), technical error (n = 1) and experimenter error (n = 1).  The sample sizes for 
Studies 1 and  2 were based on previous work with adults using a very similar 
paradigm (see Hackel et al., 2014) and research examining the development of 
intergroup bias (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011; Kinzler et al., 2009; Martin et al., 2008). 
The sample size was chosen in advance and data collection was stopped once the 
pre-specified sample size was reached.  
Materials  
Face stimuli. A subset of animacy morphs (N = 10) made available by 
Hackel et al. (2014) were used for the training and experimental trials. The morphs 
were originally developed by combining images of inanimate faces (e.g., dolls, 
statues) with well-matched human faces, resulting in 11 images that ranged from 0% 
human to 100% human (see Looser & Wheatley, 2010, for examples of the morph 
continua). As mentioned above, we carried out a pretest study with adults to identify 
the most ambiguous morph image for each face identity. 
Pretest of face stimuli with adults. We included eight morphs in the test 
phase of our study. The two remaining morph continua were used in the training 
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phase. To determine which images along the continuum to use for the test trials, we 
conducted a pretest study in which we asked 10 adult participants to categorise every 
morph image (N = 88) as either a doll or a human. Participants were also asked to 
rate how confident they were with their decision on a 5-point scale (1 = Extremely 
uncertain, 3 = Fairly certain, 5 = Extremely certain). The morph that received the 
most contradictory set of responses (approx. 50% doll and 50% human) signified the 
perceptual mid-point for each face identity. Certainty ratings were recorded in order 
to discriminate between morphs of the same face continuum that received an 
identical number of contradictory doll-human responses. In this case (n = 4), the 
image with the lower average certainty rating was selected. Note that the subjective 
mid-point of the eight morph continua was rarely compatible with the image 
generated at 50% increment. Five face identities had their highest ambiguity rating at 
increments greater than 50%, while the remaining continua were perceived to be 
most ambiguous at the physical mid-point (n = 2) or slightly lower (n = 1). The 
morphs (see Figure 1) were presented in the approximate dimensions of a life-size 
face in a central location on a black background using a Lenovo ThinkPad Intel Core 
i5 laptop. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The face morph stimuli (4 female, 4 male) used in the test trials for Studies 
1 and 2 (taken from Hackel, Looser, & Van Bavel, 2014). 
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Ensuring children understood the face stimuli. To ensure that children 
could distinguish human and doll faces, we asked six children (3 boys, Mage = 6;0,  
age range = 5;3-6;10) to discriminate between the clearly human and non-human 
points along the continua used for the test phase. In each trial (of which there were 
eight in total), children were presented with two faces that represented the 0% human 
and the 100% human increment from the same morph continuum. Their task was to 
identify which face in the pair looked more human. All six children showed 100% 
accuracy. 
Response scale. The scale employed to measure perceived humanness was 
adapted from Severson and Lemm (2016) who used it to assess individual 
differences in anthropomorphism in 5- to 9-year-old children. The adapted scale took 
the form of a bar chart with four bars representing ‘Not at all’, ‘A little bit’, ‘A 
medium amount’ and ‘A lot’ (see Figure 2, panel A). This 4-point scale was also 
used for responses to the explicit preference questions.  
Design and counterbalancing 
The main independent variable of interest was the group membership of the 
presented faces (ingroup, outgroup). We also compared the performance of 5- and 6-
year-olds. Children saw four trials with faces from their gender ingroup and four 
trials with faces from their gender outgroup. The dependent variables were mean 
humanness scores for ingroup/outgroup faces and explicit preference for both 
groups. 
Eight fixed orders were created for the test trials such that no two same-
gender faces were presented more than twice in a row and each face appeared in 
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every position. The order of ingroup and outgroup preference questions and the way 
in which the training faces were presented was also counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
Training phase. Children were trained on the response scale by being asked 
to make judgments about simple liquid measurements. The experimenter (E) 
presented children with five pictures of jugs filled with juice that directly 
corresponded to the different points on the scale and asked them to point to the bar 
that most likely represented how much juice was in each jug. Note that two of the 
pictures were identical. This was done so children understood they could use the 
same response option more than once
2
. According to our pre-specified inclusion 
criteria, children who made two or more errors during the initial scale training were 
dropped from the analyses.  
Participants were then introduced to the ‘humanness’ version of the 4-point 
scale (0 = Not at all human, 1 = A little bit human, 2 = A medium amount human, 3 = 
Completely human) and the face stimuli. They were shown the entire morph 
continuum for two face identities (one male and one female face that were not 
included in the test trials) and E emphasised corresponding scale representations at 
specific morph points. E clicked through the images and said ‘Now here this face is 
                                                          
2
 Inspection of the training phase data across both studies revealed that 
children’s accuracy on the four main liquid judgements was high (‘Not at all’: 
96.09%, ‘A little bit’: 86.72%, ‘A medium amount’: 98.44%, ‘A lot’: 95.31%) and 
accuracy for the repeated judgement was also extremely high (‘A little bit’ (2): 
98.44%). 
 46 
 
not at all human … now it’s a little bit human … now it’s a medium amount human 
… now it’s completely human’ (see Figure 2 for an illustration of the training phase). 
This process was repeated twice for each face identity and covered both directions of 
the transformation (doll to human and human to doll). 
Experimental phase. For the experimental trials, children were presented 
with the ambiguous face morph images in a sequential manner. Each face was 
obstructed by an occluder which gradually revealed the entire face (from bottom to 
top) in approximately 6 seconds. When the face was finally revealed, E asked ‘How 
human is this face?’ and indicated that the child should respond by using the scale, 
‘Not human, a little bit human, a medium amount human, or completely human?’. 
Gender was never mentioned either before or during the test trials.  
After this task, E asked children ‘How much do you like boys/girls?’ and 
again directed them towards using the scale, ‘Not at all, a little bit, a medium amount 
or a lot?’. At the end of the session, children were thanked for their participation and 
presented with a photo of male and female individuals smiling together. 
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Figure 2. The materials used in the training phase of the studies including the 
response scale (panel A), the four liquid measurements (panel B) and the four points 
along one of the training morph continua (panel C) that corresponded to the four 
points along the humanness scale.  
Coding 
For both studies, children were given a score from 0 (Not at all human) to 3 
(Completely human) for each face. Children’s responses for Study 1 were 
independently coded by another researcher and agreement was 100% for both 
humanness and preference scores.  
Humanness ratings for ingroup and outgroup faces were created for each 
child by averaging responses for the four ingroup and outgroup trials. (The ratings 
for the four female faces were averaged to act as girls’ ingroup score while the 
average rating for the four male faces acted as boys’ ingroup score). In order to 
correlate the extent of dehumanisation with children’s age, we created a relative 
dehumanisation score for each participant by subtracting their mean outgroup rating 
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from their mean ingroup rating. Higher scores on this measure implied a greater bias 
towards outgroup dehumanisation.  
Children’s preference for their gender ingroup and gender outgroup was also 
measured. We additionally created a relative own-group preference score by 
subtracting outgroup preference scores from ingroup scores. Higher positive relative 
preference values represented an overall greater explicit preference for the ingroup. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
All of the correlations, main effects and interactions reported in the analyses 
below are two-tailed. Initial analyses indicated that there were no significant main 
effects of the counterbalancing variables, and they did not significantly interact with 
children’s ratings of humanness (all F’s < 2.34, all p’s > .124). We therefore 
collapsed across these variables and do not consider them further.  
Dehumanisation 
A two-way mixed ANOVA with group membership of the face (ingroup, 
outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) as a between-
subjects factor revealed no main effect of group membership (F (1, 62) = .39, p = 
.534). There was a main effect of age suggesting that 6-year-olds’ responses were 
significantly lower (M = 1.57, SD = .59) than that of 5-year-olds (M = 1.88, SD = 
.71), F (1, 62) = 6.85, p = .011, partial η2 = .10, and a significant interaction between 
group membership and age, F (1, 62) = 5.73, p = .02, partial η2 = .09. Follow-up 
tests revealed that 6-year-olds gave significantly lower humanness ratings to 
outgroup faces (M = 1.41, SD = .55) compared to ingroup faces (M = 1.73, SD = 
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.60), t (31) = 2.05, p = .049, d = .36, while 5-year olds did not (t (31) = 1.31, p = .2; 
see Figure 3, panel A). 
To determine whether the relative tendency to dehumanise the outgroup 
increased with age, we reanalysed the data treating age as a continuous variable.  
Results showed that relative dehumanisation had a significant positive relationship 
with children’s age in months, r (62) = .29, p = .02, suggesting that this group bias 
may gradually increase with age (see Figure 4, panel A). 
Explicit group preferences 
A two-way mixed ANOVA with group (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-
subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) as a between-subjects factor yielded 
a main effect of group demonstrating that children liked their gender ingroup (M = 
2.72, SD = .60) significantly more than their gender outgroup (M = 1.67, SD = 1.10), 
F (1, 62) = 40.09, p < .001, partial η2 = .39. There was no main effect of age (F (1, 
62) = .10, p = .755) and no interaction between group and age (F (1, 62) = .22, p = 
.638), showing that even the youngest children in the sample preferred their own 
group. Interestingly, the strength of children’s relative preference for their own 
group was not significantly associated with relative dehumanisation scores (r (62) = 
.10, p = .431) or with age in months (r (62) = -.12, p = .330).  
Study 2 
In Study 2, we sought to extend the findings of Study 1 to another real-world 
group by comparing the place in which children lived to a place far way. We opted 
to use geographically based groups because, unlike gender, they need not be 
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associated with particular facial features. As a result, we could hold the faces 
constant and manipulate children’s belief about where the individuals came from.  
We compared children’s responses to faces described as coming from the city 
where the children lived to a city ‘far away’ which we called ‘Daxo’. By using a 
fictional location, we were able to create the idea of another group without tapping 
into any pre-existing national stereotypes the children might have.  Following the 
results of Study 1, we explored the possibility of an age-related increase in children’s 
tendency to dehumanise outgroup faces relative to ingroup faces.  
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two 5-year-olds (17 boys, Mage = 5;7,  age range = 5;2-5;11) and 32 
6-year-olds (16 boys, Mage = 6;5,  age range = 6;0-6;11) were recruited from a local 
school to take part in Study 2. Two more children also participated but were 
excluded from the analyses for making multiple errors during initial training of the 
scale (see below).   
Materials 
Group images. Images of the ingroup city and an outgroup city, sourced 
from the internet, were used in the test trials. Images of ‘Daxo’ were chosen on the 
basis of their notable contrast (i.e., cityscapes with skyscrapers) to the landscape of 
the ingroup (i.e., town with familiar landmarks). There were eight images of each 
group in total: four for the pretest trials and four for the test trials. 
Face stimuli. The same subset of ambiguous face morphs (N = 8) from Study 
1 was used for the test phase. However, we extracted the face stimuli from their 
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accompanying black background using Adobe Photoshop CC 2014 software and 
presented them in a smaller size on top of images of the two locations using a 
Lenovo ThinkPad Intel Core i5 laptop.  
Response scale. The same 4-point measurement scale was used for the 
study’s dependent measures. 
Design and counterbalancing 
 The main independent variables were, again, the group membership of the 
face (ingroup, outgroup) and children’s age (5-year-old, 6-year-old).  The number of 
trials was identical to Study 1 and the dependent variables were also calculated in the 
same way.  
In contrast to Study 1, we were able to counterbalance which faces were 
associated with the group categories. Four of the faces were grouped into one set 
while the remaining four faces were grouped into a second set (with two male and 
two female faces in each set). The set of faces associated with a child’s ingroup and 
outgroup was counterbalanced. As in Study 1, eight fixed orders of face presentation 
were created so that no two same-group faces were presented more than twice in a 
row and each face appeared in every position (and so with every group image). The 
first group introduced for both phases of the experiment and the order of explicit 
preference ratings was also counterbalanced.  
Procedure 
Training and pretest phase. Children engaged in the same scale training 
phase as in Study 1. Again, children that made two or more errors during the basic 
scale training with liquid measurements were excluded.  
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 E then introduced children to the two groups. She did this by giving them an 
ingroup flag representing their own city and showing them an outgroup flag 
depicting Daxo. E proceeded to direct children’s attention towards the physical 
features of the first group image by saying, ‘Look here are all of the different 
buildings in…’ followed by associating various entities (i.e., car, bird, tree) that 
appeared within similar background images with that group, for example, ‘Look 
here, this is a car from…’. To check that children understood the group manipulation 
and the nature of the stimuli, children were shown another group image and asked 
‘Where’s this?’ after which one of the training faces would appear and E then asked 
children to identify the group associated with the face by saying ‘So where is this 
face from?’. If children failed to answer one of these pretest questions correctly, then 
E explained the manipulation again. If participants failed to answer the pretest 
questions a second time, then they would have been excluded from analysis 
(however all participants passed the pretest phase). 
Experimental phase. For each test trial, E asked children to identify the 
location (‘Where’s this?’), followed by the group membership question (‘So where is 
this face from?’), similar to the pretest. Children were then asked to give a scale 
rating for how human they thought each face was. If the child identified the group 
image incorrectly, E would correct them and continue with the group membership 
question (i.e., ‘So where is this face from?’). However, if children did not answer the 
second question correctly, then this trial was dropped. After this task, children were 
asked about their preference for people from both their ingroup and the outgroup. 
Finally, children were thanked for their participation and debriefed. 
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Coding 
All of children’s responses for Study 2 were recorded by an independent 
coder. The coding was identical in 99.61% of trials for humanness scores and in 
99.22% of trials for preference scores. The few inconsistent trials were discussed 
between researchers and 100% agreement was reached for both measures.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
Eleven out of 512 trials (approximately 2.15% of the data) were excluded 
from the analyses because children failed to correctly identify where the face was 
from. Preliminary analyses confirmed that there were no effects of the 
counterbalancing conditions on humanness ratings (all F’s < 2.35, all p’s > .113).  
Dehumanisation 
A two-way mixed ANOVA with group membership of the face (ingroup, 
outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) as a between-
subjects factor did not reveal a significant main effect of group membership although 
outgroup ratings were slightly lower (M = 1.84, SD = .72) than ingroup ratings (M = 
2.03, SD = .68), F (1, 62) = 3.64, p = .061, partial η2 = .06. There was no main effect 
of age (F (1, 62) = .57, p = .452) and no significant group membership × age 
interaction on humanness ratings, F (1, 62) = 3.25, p = .076, partial η2 = .05. 
However, since we observed an effect among 6-year olds in Study 1, we explored the 
non-significant interaction further. Individual paired-samples t-tests indicated a 
pattern of results similar to that found in Study 1. Five-year-olds’ responses were not 
influenced by the group manipulation (t (31) = .08, p = .935). In comparison, 6-year-
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olds rated faces that belonged to their outgroup as significantly less human (M = 
1.70, SD = .70) than those that belonged to their ingroup (M = 2.06, SD = .64), t (31) 
= 2.39, p = .023, d = .42 (see Figure 3, panel B). We can only speculate as to why the 
results were somewhat weaker in this study. A possible explanation may involve the 
salience of the group distinction. The faces presented to children were identical in 
both conditions in Study 2 whereas the group distinction in Study 1, based on 
gender, was marked by physical features of the faces. Related to this, the analysis 
may not have been sufficiently powered to detect the interaction observed in Study 1.  
Figure 3. The results from Study 1 with gender groups (panel A) and Study 2 with 
geographically based groups (panel B) when age was treated as a categorical variable 
(error bars represent one standard error). 
In order to explore whether there was a gradual increase in dehumanisation 
with age in Study 2, we reran the analyses treating age as a continuous variable.  As 
in Study 1, there was a significant positive relationship between relative 
dehumanisation scores and age in months, r (62) = .26, p = .041 (see Figure 4, panel 
B). Thus, with a more powerful means of detecting age-related change, we found a 
significant increase in relative dehumanisation of outgroup members between the 
ages of 5 and 6 which suggests a similar emergence of outgroup dehumanisation in 
both these types of group. 
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Figure 4. The relationship between age (in months) and relative dehumanisation 
from Study 1 with gender groups (panel A) and Study 2 with geographically based 
groups (panel B). 
To confirm that the results observed in Study 1 (in which the groups were 
based on gender) were similar to the results of Study 2 (in which the groups were 
based on geographical location), we conducted a combined analysis where we 
investigated the effects of the group membership of the faces, the age of children, 
and the study in which children participated. Importantly, the study in which children 
participated did not interact with the critical variables of group membership or age 
(all F’s < 1.24, all p’s > .268). Noteworthy in this combined analysis was the  
significant interaction between children’s age and the group membership of the face, 
F (1, 124) = 8.88, p = .003, partial η2 = .07. Whereas humanness ratings for the 
ingroup did not differ between 5 and 6 (t (126) = -.03, p = .974), there was a 
significant decline in humanness ratings of outgroup faces between 5 (M = 1.98, SD 
= .69) and 6 years of age (M = 1.55, SD = .64), t (126) = 3.65, p < .001, d = .65. This 
result implies that the observed age differences were due to 6-year-olds perceiving 
less humanness in outgroup faces rather than more humanness in the faces of 
ingroup members. This adds weight to the claim that this phenomenon represents a 
potential age–related increase in outgroup dehumanisation rather than ingroup 
humanisation. 
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Explicit group preferences 
A two-way mixed ANOVA with group (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-
subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) as a between-subjects factor showed 
that children liked their own geographically based group significantly more (M = 
2.72, SD = .63) than the outgroup (M = 1.52, SD = 1.02), F (1, 62) = 71.60, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .54. There was no main effect of age (F (1, 62) = 1.66, p = .203) and no 
group × age interaction (F (1, 62) = .11, p = .743) demonstrating that, again, even the 
youngest children in the sample preferred their own group. Children’s relative group 
preference score was not significantly associated with relative dehumanisation (r 
(62) = -.01, p = .942) or with age (r (62) = -.10, p = .413).  
As with the perceived humanness measure, we combined the data from both 
studies to investigate any differences between children’s explicit preferences for 
gender and geographically based groups. This combined analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of group, F (1, 62) = 106.46, p < .001, partial η2 = .46, 
confirming that children prefer their own group, but there were no significant 
interactions between the study in which children participated and group or age (all 
F’s < 1.32, all p’s > .253). It therefore appears that children felt similarly positive 
about both types of groups and that this preference did not vary with age. 
General Discussion 
Taken together, these studies illustrate that 6-year-old children perceive less 
humanness in outgroup faces. Study 1 showed that 6-year-olds perceived ambiguous 
faces to be less human when they belonged to their gender outgroup. This finding 
fits with earlier research suggesting that gender influences young children’s social 
evaluations (Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Levy & Haaf, 1994; Martin & Fabes, 2001; 
 57 
 
Shutts et al., 2010) and extends it by showing that children sometimes dehumanise 
their gender outgroup. The findings from Study 2 replicated this pattern and 
extended it to another type of group based on geographical location.  Thus, even 
when the faces were physically identical in the two conditions, children still 
attributed less humanness to outgroup faces with increasing age.  Our results 
complement and extend the small body of previous work on the development of 
dehumanisation (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Martin et al., 2008; Van Noorden et al., 
2014) by establishing that, as well as affecting the attribution of uniquely human 
emotions and traits, group membership influences young children’s perception of 
how human faces appear to be. Overall, this research suggests that the origins of this 
powerful, and often damaging, social phenomenon emerge relatively early in 
development.  
We tested dehumanisation in younger children than the majority of previous 
studies and, as a result, we were able to identify a potentially important 
developmental transition. The tendency to dehumanise the outgroup relative to the 
ingroup gradually increased between the ages of 5 and 6 for both gender and 
geographically based groups. It is interesting to consider why 5-year-olds did not 
show a bias to dehumanise outgroup members. It is not likely that it was due to 
misunderstanding the task as the results of the control study, training phase and 
pretest questions established that 5-year-old children understood the stimuli, were 
able to use the scale and, in Study 2, could identify the group membership of the 
faces. Moreover, analysis of the explicit preference scores demonstrated that the 
manipulation was effective for younger children since they preferred their ingroup to 
the outgroup in both studies. The reasons for this developmental change in 
dehumanisation remain an important query for future research. One possible account 
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relates to the fact that 5-year-olds have had significantly less experience with broader 
social groups than have 6-year-olds (Banaji et al., 2008). It is also possible that 
dehumanisation could be associated with the emergence of outgroup negativity (as 
opposed to ingroup preference) which may develop only after children’s sixth 
birthday (Buttelmann & Böhm, 2014). In this context, it is interesting to note that the 
developmental pattern identified in our studies parallels that found in a recent study 
on pain perception. Dore, Hoffman, Lillard, and Trawalter (2014) found that, 
between the ages of 5 and 10, White children show a gradual decrease in the extent 
to which they believe Black children experience pain. Reductions in the perception 
of others’ pain have been linked to decreased mind attribution (Gray et al., 2007; 
Gray & Wegner, 2009) and depersonalisation (Loughnan et al., 2010), highlighting 
that this developmental period might be particularly important in understanding the 
origins of dehumanisation.  
Another interesting aspect of our results is that performance on the 
dehumanisation measure was not related to explicit intergroup preference. The 
younger children in our sample showed robust evidence of ingroup bias for both 
their own gender and own geographically based group, however, they did not show 
evidence of dehumanising the outgroup. Furthermore, at an individual level, the 
extent of children’s preference for their own groups did not predict their tendency to 
dehumanise outgroup faces. This finding draws attention to another interesting 
parallel with the work of Dore et al. (2014) who found the belief that outgroup 
members feel less pain than ingroup members was not moderated by explicit social 
preference for own-race individuals. Additionally, in a study with adults, Demoulin 
et al. (2009) observed that ingroup preference sometimes appears in the absence of 
infrahumanisation (for e.g., when groups are based on random allocation). In sum, 
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these studies propose that dehumanisation is a distinct concept that cannot simply be 
reduced to intergroup preference. Further research is needed to determine the 
relationship between these two concepts in development.  
Our research opens up a number of other important avenues for future 
studies. Individuals who are perceived to have less of a mind, for instance, are seen 
by adults to be less worthy of moral consideration (Waytz et al., 2010). It would be 
interesting to investigate young children’s attribution of mind to members of 
different groups and whether it affects their moral decision-making and judgements 
about the acceptability of causing harm. Developmental research has found that 
emotions and motives linked with morally disengaging from one’s own behaviour 
are associated with instances of bullying in schools (Menesini et al., 2003; Van 
Noorden et al., 2014). Hence it will also be important to examine the detrimental 
effects of dehumanisation among young children in more applied intergroup settings.  
The present studies demonstrate that group membership influences the 
perception of humanness in young children. Thinking of another group as less 
human has been shown to predict their mistreatment and disregard (Bandura et al., 
1975; Cuddy et al., 2007; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). This work suggests that the 
origins of this frequently harmful process appear relatively early in development. It 
therefore identifies a potentially important age at which to target interventions 
focused on combatting the phenomenon of outgroup dehumanisation. 
 
 
 
 60 
 
Chapter 3: Biases in Children’s Mental State Attribution 
Reference:  
McLoughlin, N., & Over, H. (2017). Young children are more likely to 
spontaneously attribute mental states to members of their own group. Psychological 
Science. doi:10.1177/0956797617710724
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Abstract 
We investigated whether young children were more likely to spontaneously attribute 
mental states to members of their own social group than to members of an outgroup. 
We asked 5- and 6-year-old children to describe the actions of interacting geometric 
shapes and manipulated whether children believed these shapes represented their 
own group or another group. Children of both ages spontaneously used mental state 
words more often in their description of ingroup members compared with outgroup 
members. Furthermore, 6-year-olds produced a greater diversity of mental state 
terms when talking about their own social group. These effects held across two 
different social categories (based on gender and geographical location). This 
research has important implications for understanding a broad range of social 
phenomena including dehumanisation, intergroup bias and theory of mind. 
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Introduction 
The ability to understand others’ minds is vital to human social interaction 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Gray et al., 2007). From a young age, children are able to 
reason about the intentions (Carpenter et al., 1998), desires (Repacholi & Gopnik, 
1997), and perhaps even the beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005) of other people.  
However, social psychological research has demonstrated that adults do not 
always take the mental life of others into account (Harris & Fiske, 2006). They 
sometimes ‘dehumanise’ members of social outgroups or deny their mental 
capacities, such as intelligence, agency and emotional depth (Haslam, 2006; Leyens 
et al., 2000). Outgroup dehumanisation has been an integral part of prejudice and 
discrimination throughout history and remains an important political issue today 
(Haslam, 2006). Although the tendency to dehumanise others is not limited to any 
one political group, rising support for far right parties throughout the West makes the 
significance of this topic all too clear (Roth, 2017).  
In the present study, we combined developmental work on theory of mind 
with social psychological research on dehumanisation by investigating whether 
young children are more likely to spontaneously consider the mental states of 
ingroup members than those of outgroup members. In order to do this, we adapted a 
paradigm created by Abell et al. (2000) in which participants are asked to describe 
the behaviour of interacting geometric shapes. The actions of these shapes have been 
shown to elicit mental state terms in typically developing children and adults (Abell 
et al., 2000). We manipulated whether children believed these shapes represented 
members of their own social group or a different social group. We predicted that 
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they would use mental state terms more often, and with greater variety, when 
describing ingroup interactions. 
We tested these hypotheses with two different types of social group, one 
relating to gender and the other relating to geographical location. We chose to 
manipulate gender because previous research has shown that this category is 
particularly salient to young children and that knowledge of gender stereotypes 
influences their aspirations and career goals (Bian, Leslie, & Cimpian, 2017). We 
decided to manipulate geographical or national origin as well because this social 
division is so deeply intertwined with current political debates regarding 
immigration. We reasoned that if the tendency to attribute more mental states to 
members of the ingroup is robust, then the effect should hold across both types of 
group.  
We opted to work with 5- and 6-year-olds because, by this age, children are 
proficient at mental state reasoning (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), frequently 
incorporate mental state terms into their conversation (Frith & Frith, 2003) and show 
preferences for members of their own gender and geographically based group 
(McLoughlin, Tipper, & Over, 2017).  
Method 
Participants 
 The sample consisted of 64 5-year-olds (mean age: 5 years 6 months; age 
range: 4 years 11 months-5 years 11 months) and 64 6-year-olds (mean age: 6 years 
5 months; age range: 6 years 0 months-6 years 11 months) with an equal number of 
boys and girls in each age group. The children were recruited from local primary 
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schools situated in a small town in northern England and from a science museum 
located in an urban centre. Further demographic information was not collected.  
Six additional children were tested but excluded from analyses because of 
developmental delay (n = 1), technical error (n = 3), shyness (i.e., the child did not 
respond to any of the test questions or prompts; n = 1) and misunderstanding the 
instructions (n = 1). The sample size was based on previous research exploring the 
development of intergroup cognition (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2008; 
McLoughlin et al., 2017). We decided on the sample size for each comparison in 
advance and data collection was stopped once the pre-specified sample size was 
reached.  
Stimuli and Materials 
Frith-Happé animations 
 The videos were originally developed by Abell et al. (2000) and later used 
by other labs (e.g., Salter, Seigal, Claxton, Lawrence, & Skuse, 2008) to examine 
mental state attribution. The key feature of these videos from our perspective is that 
they can be described in terms of simple actions (e.g., pushing each other) or in 
terms of perceived mental states (e.g., teasing each other).  
The videos depict two animated triangles, one big and one small, which 
appear to interact. In the video used for the warm-up trial, one shape follows the 
other around the screen in a way that could be described as trying to imitate or mock 
that character. The main purpose of this warm-up trial was to familiarise the children 
with the stimuli. In the two videos used in the test phase, one triangle appears to 
coax the other one outside (the coaxing video); in the other video, one triangle 
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appears to deliberately surprise the other one (the surprising video). A fourth video 
created by Abell et al. (2000) was discarded because the content was not ideally 
suited for young children (i.e., one shape attempts to seduce the other).  
Each video lasted approximately 40 seconds. To avoid any assumptions 
related to gender or stereotypical associations between nations and colours, we 
changed the original colours of the animated shapes (red and blue) to black using 
Movavi Video Editor software. The videos were presented to participants on a 
Lenovo ThinkPad Intel Core i5 laptop.  
Response scale 
A 4-point Likert scale was used to measure children’s explicit preference for 
the social groups (McLoughlin et al., 2017). This scale took the form of a bar chart 
with a ‘Not at all’ option followed by black bars that increased in height to represent 
‘A little’, ‘A medium amount’ and ‘A lot’.  
Design and Counterbalancing 
The study had a 2 (group type: gender, geographical location) × 2 (group 
membership: ingroup, outgroup) × 2 (age: 5-year-old, 6-year-old) mixed design. 
Children’s age and the group type were treated as between-subjects variables and 
group membership was treated as a within-subjects variable. The dependent 
variables were the total number and the diversity of mental state terms that children 
used in their description of the videos. 
The video associated with the two groups was counterbalanced so that half 
of the children saw the coaxing video paired with their own group and half of the 
children saw the coaxing video paired with their outgroup. The order in which the 
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two videos (coaxing and surprising) were presented was also counterbalanced, as 
was the order in which children were presented with the in- and outgroup video.   
Procedure 
Warm-up trial 
 After a brief warm-up phase where the experimenter (E) encouraged 
children to engage in a conversation with her, she introduced the warm-up video. 
This warm-up trial was used to acclimatise children to the procedure. E introduced 
the video without making any references to gender or geography. She showed 
children a slide with two triangles and said, ‘The first video tells the story of two 
children. Look, here is one child’ and pointed to the big triangle and continued, 
saying, ‘And here is another child,’ and pointed to the smaller triangle. She informed 
children that after watching the video, they could tell her what they thought was 
happening. E then played the relevant video twice. Following this, a screenshot 
image of the two triangles from the video appeared on the screen and E asked 
children four questions to elicit descriptions of what had happened. E first asked, 
‘What do you think was happening in the video?’, and once the child had responded, 
‘What do you think the children were doing?’ These questions were followed by two 
further probes in which E asked, ‘Tell me about this child,’ pointing first to the 
bigger character, then to the smaller character. If the child did not respond to a test 
question, E prompted him or her again. If the child did not respond to the prompt, 
then E moved onto the next question. If the child responded to the test questions with 
a response like ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I already told you’, E moved onto the next 
question without using the prompt. The children were not given any specific 
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feedback on their performance; the experimenter responded ‘All right!’ or ‘Okay!’ to 
their statements regardless of what they said.  
Gender groups 
 In the gender group condition, E introduced the test videos by saying ‘Now I 
am going to show you two more videos- one of them is going to be about two boys 
and the other one is going to be about two girls’. The procedure for the test trials was 
identical to that of the warm-up trial with the exception that E specified the gender of 
the characters for the test questions (e.g., ‘What do you think the boys were doing?’, 
‘Tell me about this girl’).  
Geographically based groups 
 In this condition, E introduced the ingroup test video by saying that it 
concerned ‘two children who live in the same town as you. They go to a school just 
like your school and they talk just like you do’. The children were told that the 
outgroup video, in comparison, involved ‘two children who live in a country a long 
way away from here. They go to a school quite different from your school and they 
talk in a different language to you’. The test questions were identical to those of the 
warm-up trial except that the geographical origin of the characters was specified 
(e.g., ‘What do you think the children from your town were doing?’, ‘Tell me about 
this child from the country far away’).  
Explicit preference 
 Once the videos were over, E introduced participants to the 4-point 
measurement scale and asked them to point to how much they liked children 
belonging to their own and the other social group. This was done to check that they 
 67 
 
preferred their own group (Dunham et al., 2011). At the end of the session, children 
were thanked for their participation and debriefed in a way as to ensure that they left 
the experiment in a positive frame of mind. 
Coding 
Coding scheme 
 We developed a coding scheme based on previous research investigating the 
mental state content of adult and children’s speech (Abell et al., 2000; Meins, 
Fernyhough, Arnott, Leekam, & de Rosnay, 2013; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000). 
Words were counted as referring to mental states if they referenced a character’s 
thoughts and desires (e.g., ‘to want’, ‘to try’, ‘to like’, ‘to know’, ‘to decide’, ‘to 
look for’), emotions (e.g., ‘angry’, ‘scared’, ‘upset’), intentions (e.g., ‘to be naughty’, 
‘to be cheeky’) or current states (e.g., ‘to be funny’, ‘to be shy’). References to 
mental states involving interactions between the two characters were also coded in 
this category (e.g., ‘pretending’, ‘tricking’, ‘arguing’, ‘surprising’, ‘spying’). We 
coded the total number of mental state words children produced to describe each 
group and the diversity of mental state terms they used in each description. For 
example, a child who twice said a character was ‘trying to’ do something produced 
two mental state terms in total but only one unique mental state term. Alternatively, 
when a child used two mental state words in conjunction with each other, for 
example, saying that a character “’wanted to scare’ someone, they were coded as 
producing two mental state terms and two unique mental state terms. 
Occasionally, in the gender group condition, children used an incorrect 
gender pronoun when referring to one of the characters (for e.g., referring to a 
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character E had introduced as female as ‘he’). Mental state words produced in 
combination with the incorrect pronoun were excluded from the analyses (n = 2).  
Reliability 
 Children’s responses for both test videos were transcribed and coded by the 
first author. A second rater, unaware of condition, recoded 100% of the data from the 
transcripts. Reliability between the two coders was very high for the number of 
mental state terms in the ingroup (intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) = .99, 95% 
CI [.99, .99]) and outgroup condition (ICC = .99, 95% CI [.99, .99]). Reliability was 
also very high for the diversity of mental state words produced in both conditions 
(ICC = .99, 95% CI [.98, .99] and ICC = .98, 95% CI [.98, .99] respectively). The 
few disagreements between the coders were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
In our preliminary analyses, we inspected the data to see if there were any 
main effects of participant gender on the dependent variables. There were not (all p’s 
> .145) and, as a result, we collapsed across this variable and do not consider it 
further.    
Number of Mental State Words Produced 
We conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA with group membership 
associated with the video (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-
year-old, 6-year-old) and group type (gender, geographical location) as between-
subject factors.  In line with our predictions, this result revealed a main effect of 
group membership: Participants used significantly more mental state words in the 
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ingroup condition (M = 2.44, SD = 2.55) than in the outgroup condition, (M = 1.77, 
SD = 1.92), F (1, 124) = 8.50, p = .004, partial η2 = .06, 95% CI = [.22, 1.13] (see 
Figure 5, panel A). There was also a main effect of age; 6-year-olds produced more 
mental state terms (M = 2.49, SD = 2.37) than 5-year-olds did (M = 1.71, SD = 2.12), 
F (1, 124) = 5.96, p = .016, partial η2 = .05, 95% CI = [.15, 1.42], presumably 
because older children are generally more proficient in the use of these terms 
(Hughes & Dunn, 1998). There was no main effect of group type (F (1, 124) = 1.49, 
p = .225), no interaction between group membership and age (F (1, 124) = .46, p > 
.250) and no interaction between group type and group membership or between 
group membership and age (all F’s < 1.15, all p’s > .250). There was also no three-
way interaction among these variables (F (1, 124) = .02, p > .250). Thus, children 
produced a greater number of mental state terms when describing their ingroup than 
their outgroup and this effect held across both types of social group – gender and 
geographically based groups. 
Having run these analyses, we wanted to check that this effect was not driven 
by a tendency for children to talk more about the ingroup overall. We therefore 
analysed how many words participants spoke in total in each condition. Children did 
not produce significantly more words in the ingroup condition (M = 61) than in the 
outgroup condition (M = 57; t (127) = 1.64, p = .104). Although the results of this 
analysis did not reach statistical significance, we adopted a conservative approach 
and reran our original analyses using the proportion of children’s speech that 
referenced mental states as the dependent variable. This analysis showed that 
children used proportionally more mental state words when talking about the ingroup 
video (M = .05, SD = .07) than when talking about the outgroup video (M = .03, SD 
= .03), F (1, 124) = 7.60, p = .007, partial η2 = .06, 95% CI = [.00, .02]. There was 
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no main effect of age (F (1, 124) = 2.72, p = .102) or group type (F (1, 124) = .01, p 
> .250) and no interactions of group type and the other critical variables (all F’s < 
1.09, all p’s > .250) on the proportion of mental state words children produced. The 
group membership × age interaction was also not significant (F (1, 124) = 3.61, p = 
.060). 
Diversity of Mental State Words Produced 
We carried out a mixed ANOVA with the group membership of the video 
(ingroup, outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-year-old) and 
group type (gender, geographical location) as between-subject factors. This analysis 
yielded a main effect of group membership, F (1, 124) = 4.41, p = .038, partial η2 = 
.03, 95% CI = [.01, .47]. Again, consistent with our predictions, children produced a 
greater diversity of mental state terms in the ingroup condition (M = 1.35, SD = 1.25) 
than in the outgroup condition, (M = 1.11, SD = 1.05). There was also a main effect 
of age; 6-year-olds used a more diverse range of mental state words (M = 1.48, SD = 
1.20) than did 5-year-olds (M = .98, SD = 1.06), F (1, 124) = 9.07, p = .003, partial 
η2 = .07, 95% CI = [.17, .82], most probably because older children have a wider 
vocabulary (Hughes & Dunn, 1998). These main effects were qualified by a 
significant group membership × age interaction, F (1, 124) = 4.41, p = .038, partial 
η2 = .03. Follow-up tests showed that 6-year-olds used a greater diversity of mental 
state words for the ingroup video (M = 1.72, SD = 1.25) than for the outgroup video 
(M = 1.23, SD = 1.11), t (63) = 2.86, p = .006, d = .36, 95% CI [.15, .82] (see Figure 
5, panel B), whereas 5-year-olds did not (t (63) = .00, p > .250). As in the previous 
analysis, there was no main effect of group type (F (1, 124) = .83, p > .250), no 
interaction between group type with either age or group membership (all F’s < .37, 
all p’s > .250), and no significant three-way interaction (F (1, 124) = 1.33, p > .250). 
 71 
 
These findings suggest that older children’s bias to generate a greater diversity of 
mental state terms in the ingroup condition held across both gender and 
geographically based groups. 
In order to control for any possible influence of the total number of words 
spoken by the children in the two conditions, we also reran these analyses with 
proportional scores. In these analyses, there was also a significant main effect of 
group membership, F (1, 124) = 4.06, p = .046, partial η2 = .03, 95% CI = [.00, .02], 
and a significant interaction between group membership and age F (1, 124) = 6.71, p 
= .011, partial η2 = .05. Again, follow-up tests showed that 6-year-olds produced a 
greater diversity of mental state words when describing ingroup interactions (M = 
.04, SD = .08) than when describing outgroup interactions (M = .02, SD = .02), t (63) 
= 2.49, p = .016, d = .31, 95% CI = [.00, .04]. Five-year olds’ responses did not 
differ significantly between conditions (t (31) = - .75, p > .250). There was no 
significant main effect of age (F (1, 124) = 2.69, p = .103) or group type (F (1, 124) 
= .01, p > .250) and no other interactions were significant (all F’s < 2.17, all p’s > 
.143). 
Explicit Preference 
Finally, we conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA with children’s group 
membership (ingroup, outgroup) as a within-subjects factor and age (5-year-old, 6-
year-old) and group type (gender, geographical location) as between-subjects factors 
on explicit preference ratings. This analysis confirmed that children liked members 
of their own group (M = 2.63, SD = .72) significantly more than members of the 
other group (M = 1.76, SD = 1.01), F (1, 124) = 60.14, p < .001, partial η2 = .33, 
95% CI = [.65, 1.09]. There was no main effect of age on children’s explicit 
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preference (F (1, 124) = .90, p > .250) and no interaction between group membership 
and age (F (1, 124) = .01, p > .250). There was no main effect of group type (F (1, 
124) = 1.93, p = .168) and this variable did not interact with group membership 
and/or age (all F’s < 2.15, all p’s > .145). Hence, it seems that children felt similarly 
positive about both their own gender and geographically based group and their 
explicit preference did not vary by age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The results for the mean number of mental state words (panel A) and for 
the mean diversity of mental states words (panel B) that 5- and 6-year-old children 
produced in each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
Discussion 
Our results reveal that young children use mental state terms more often 
when describing members of their own social group. Furthermore, 6-year-old, but 
not 5-year-old, children use a greater diversity of mental state words when talking 
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about their ingroup. This effect held across two different social categories – one 
based on gender and the other on geography. Importantly, these results cannot be 
explained by an increased motivation to talk more about the own group in general, 
because they held even when we reran the analyses with the proportion of mental 
state words children produced for each video. Overall, our findings demonstrate that 
young children are selective in the way they attribute mental states to others.  
This study has important implications for our understanding of the origins of 
intergroup bias. Previous developmental research has concentrated on children’s 
relative preferences for members ingroup members (Dunham et al., 2011) and has 
established that children show both explicit and implicit preferences (Baron & 
Banaji, 2006) from early in development. Here, in contrast, we focus on mental state 
attribution. This topic is closely related to the concept of dehumanisation (Harris & 
Fiske, 2006). Prior studies with adults have found that they are less likely to attribute 
a mind to outgroup members (Hackel et al., 2014) and that this tendency has 
significant consequences for moral judgements (Gray et al., 2007). Relevant work in 
philosophy and sociology has shown that dehumanisation is pervasive within the 
media and other social domains (Esses, Medianu, & Lawson, 2013; Redeker, 2007) 
and could thus have wide-ranging repercussions for group relations. Research into 
the development of dehumanising biases may therefore enhance our general 
understanding of intergroup harm and prejudice. However, until now, this subject 
has received relatively little attention. Recent studies have suggested that children 
perceive less humanness in outgroup faces (McLoughlin et al., 2017) and rate the 
emotions of outgroup members to be less intense than those of the ingroup (Martin et 
al., 2008). Our results inform work in this related field by showing that, at least from 
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the age of 5, children are less likely to spontaneously reference the mental states of 
individuals belonging to another group.  
Our findings also have interesting implications for research on theory of 
mind.  Since Wimmer and Perner’s seminal 1983 article, the study of mental state 
understanding has blossomed within developmental psychology. This work has 
primarily been dedicated to when children first develop the ability to reason about 
the minds of others, including their feelings (Hughes & Dunn, 1998) and beliefs 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The current findings underline the importance of 
considering the situations in which children are more or less motivated to deploy this 
skill, in addition to investigating when this ability emerges (Over, 2016). 
A valuable question for future inquiry is whether our results would extend 
beyond children in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and 
Democratic) cultures (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  Previous research has 
revealed systematic differences in the emphasis that cultural groups place on mental 
states as explanations for other people’s behaviour (Lillard, 1998).  Cultural 
variations in both mental state attribution (Lillard, 1998) and intergroup dynamics 
(Fischer & Derham, 2016) could influence the relationship we observed in this 
study. 
The present report addresses a surprising disconnect between the literatures 
examining the development of intergroup cognition and theory of mind (Rakoczy, 
2014). The combination of these research areas is of potential interest to academics 
working in applied settings. For example, future research could explore the social 
consequences of biased mental state attribution and whether encouraging children to 
attribute a mental life to outgroup members may increase their readiness to engage in 
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prosocial behaviour (Drummond, Paul, Waugh, Hammond, & Brownell, 2014) in 
Western contexts and beyond.  In this way, investigation into the development of 
dehumanisation may ultimately inform research-led interventions to foster positive 
intergroup relations. 
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Chapter 4 : Improving Children’s Intergroup Relations 
Reference:  
McLoughlin, N., & Over, H. (2017). Encouraging young children to mentalise about 
a perceived outgroup increases empathic helping towards them. Manuscript 
submitted for publication.
4
 
Abstract 
We investigated whether encouraging young children to discuss the mental states of 
an immigrant group would impact on their perception of a group member’s 
emotional experience and elicit more positive behaviour towards them. Five- and 6-
year-old children were either prompted to talk about the thoughts and feelings of this 
social group or to talk about their actions. Across two studies, we found that this 
manipulation increased the extent to which children helped a novel member of the 
immigrant group who was the victim of a minor transgression. Interestingly, this 
manipulation did not lead to greater helping towards a victim from the children’s 
own culture and did not influence their perception of a victim’s negative emotions. 
These results may have implications for interventions aimed at fostering positive 
intergroup relations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The author, Niamh McLoughlin, designed the experiment, collected the data, 
analysed the results, and wrote the article under the supervision of Dr. Harriet Over. 
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Introduction 
Prejudice and discrimination remain substantial social problems. Although 
these issues are not exclusively linked to any one political party or viewpoint, the 
rise in support for far-right groups in Western societies serves to highlight their 
significance (Vieten & Poynting, 2016). In the current political climate, particular 
emphasis has been placed on negative attitudes towards immigrants (Sanneh, 2016; 
Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). One of the key aims for many researchers in the social 
sciences is to understand the processes by which social biases are acquired and 
expressed in the hope that this knowledge can ultimately inform research-led 
interventions to reduce the prevalence of these problems. Experimental research into 
the psychological origins of prejudice has an important role to play in this process. 
One aspect of intergroup dynamics that has received attention over recent 
years is dehumanisation (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Leyens, 2009; Smith, 2012). 
This generally refers to the perception that a person is not entirely human as a 
consequence of their group membership (Vaes et al., 2012). In its subtle form, 
dehumanisation is associated with attributing fewer mental states and uniquely 
human traits to outgroup than to ingroup members (Demoulin et al., 2009; Hackel et 
al., 2014; Haslam, 2006). Related to this, Leyens and colleagues (2001)  have shown 
that outgroup members are thought to experience secondary emotions, like pride and 
remorse, less strongly than ingroup members. This latter phenomenon is referred to 
as ‘infrahumanisation’ within the social psychological literature (Boccato et al., 
2007; Vaes et al., 2012). Dehumanisation and infrahumanisation have been 
implicated in negative behavioural outcomes such as a reduced willingness to help 
perceived outgroups when they are the victims of harm (Andrighetto et al., 2014; 
Čehajić et al., 2009; Cuddy et al., 2007).  
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Previous research with children has shown that the psychological origins of 
intergroup bias are present early in development (Banaji et al., 2008; Patterson & 
Bigler, 2006). For example, by the age of five, children prefer members of their own 
gender, language and racial group on both explicit and implicit measures (Aboud, 
1988; Dunham et al., 2015; Kinzler et al., 2007).  Furthermore, they are often more 
prosocial towards members of their own social groups (for a review, see Over, 
2018). Recent research has begun to explore the developmental origins of 
dehumanisation. Children, aged between 6 and 12 years, attribute more uniquely 
human qualities (e.g., creativity, politeness, trustworthiness) to their own racial 
(Costello & Hodson, 2014) and peer groups (Van Noorden et al., 2014).  In a related 
study, McLoughlin et al. (2017) found that 6-year-olds perceive ambiguous doll-
human faces to be less human when they belonged to outgroups based on gender and 
geography. Developmental research on infrahumanisation has investigated how 
children perceive the emotions of different groups and showed that they rate the 
secondary emotions of national outgroup members to be less intense than those of 
the ingroup (Martin et al., 2008).   
Broadly relevant to work on dehumanisation, McLoughlin and Over (2017) 
demonstrated that children as young as 5 years of age are more likely to 
spontaneously reference the mental states of ingroup individuals when asked to 
describe their behaviour. In this paradigm, children were presented with animations 
that depicted interacting geometric shapes. Participants were either told that these 
videos represented interactions between members of their own social group or 
members of another group. Both 5- and 6-year-old children produced a greater 
number of mental state terms (e.g., ‘to know’, ‘to scare’, ‘to be sad’) in their 
description of the ingroup video compared to the outgroup video. The older children 
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also used a more diverse range of mental state words when talking about their own 
group. This effect held across two different social categories, one relating to gender 
and the other relating to place of origin or geographical location.  
It is not yet clear whether children’s tendency to attribute fewer mental states 
to the outgroup has a causal influence on their understanding of a group member’s 
mental experiences or in their behaviour towards them. Processing the mind of 
another person appears to be an important step in the attribution of humanness and in 
motivating an empathic view of others (Bruneau et al., 2015; Harris & Fiske, 2006; 
Waytz et al., 2010).  We were, therefore, interested in whether a mentalising 
manipulation would first affect children’s perception of an outgroup individual’s 
emotions.   
We were also interested in the potential impact of mentalising about social 
outgroup members on children’s prosocial intergroup behaviour. Shih, Wang, Trahan 
Bucher, and Stotzer (2009) found that prompting predominately White adults to 
imagine how an Asian individual was feeling increased instrumental helping towards 
another Asian person in an independent situation. Also pertinent to this hypothesis, 
Bruneau et al. (2015) revealed that reading individuating information about team 
members belonging to a minimal outgroup, especially when this information referred 
to their mental states, considerably reduced the empathy gap between the in- and the 
outgroup. More generally, research with children has shown that hearing a parent 
talk about mental states and emotions predicts the likelihood that toddlers and young 
children engage in prosocial activities (Brownell, Svetlova, Anderson, Nichols, & 
Drummond, 2013; Garner, Dunsmore, & Southam-Gerrow, 2008) and that this is 
particularly true in empathic helping situations (i.e., offering the experimenter a 
blanket when she indicated she was cold; Drummond, Paul, Waugh, Hammond, & 
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Brownell, 2014). In a study more closely related to an intergroup context, Sierksma, 
Thijs, and Verkuyten (2015) examined whether inducing empathy would overcome 
children’s propensity to help their ingroup peers more often than outgroup peers. 
They found that when 8- to 13-year-old children were prompted to reflect on how a 
peer felt in a distressing situation, they reported similar intentions to help that child 
regardless of whether they were a friend or a non-friend.  
We investigated whether encouraging young children to think about the 
mental states of a perceived outgroup in a range of everyday situations would alter 
their understanding of a novel outgroup child’s distress and increase the level of 
empathic helping shown towards them. We chose to investigate this question in the 
context of immigration; this decision was based on the significance of this social 
group in current political debates. Participants were presented with a picture book 
containing images of children who were described as coming from a country very far 
away but who have recently moved to the UK. In the experimental condition, the 
children were encouraged to talk about what the immigrant group were thinking and 
feeling. In the control condition, participants were asked the same number of 
questions about the immigrant group but these questions encouraged them to discuss 
the group’s actions rather than their mental states. Following this manipulation, the 
children were introduced to two novel group members who were the victims of 
minor harm. We measured the children’s perception of one victim’s emotional 
experience, as well as their prosocial behaviour towards the other victim. To 
examine if any effect of the manipulation was specific to the immigrant group or if it 
also generalised to other children who had always lived in the UK, we included two 
further conditions in which participants were again asked to either talk about the 
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mental states or behaviour of the immigrant group but, instead, were told that the two 
victims presented after the storybook lived close to them.  
We tested 5- to 6-year-olds because children in this age range exhibit 
intergroup biases (Dunham et al., 2011; Kinzler & Spelke, 2011), including a 
tendency to dehumanise members of outgroups (Martin et al., 2008; McLoughlin & 
Over, 2017; McLoughlin et al., 2017), and sometimes report negative attitudes 
towards immigrants (Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 2006) . In addition to 
this, they are capable of explicitly reasoning about the mental states of others 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and use mental state terms quite frequently in 
conversation (Frith & Frith, 2003).  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Ninety-six 5- and 6-year-olds (48 boys, Mage = 6 years 0 months, age range 
= 5 years 0 months-6 years 11 months) were recruited from a medium sized museum 
located in northern England. Five more children participated in the study but were 
excluded due to not understanding the sticker distribution task (see below, n = 1), not 
completing the task (also see below, n = 1), parental interruption (n = 2) and for not 
paying attention (n = 1). The children were randomly allocated to participate in one 
of the four conditions, resulting in 24 participants in each group. The sample size for 
both studies was decided in advance and was in accordance with past research 
examining the effect of intergroup strategies (Brown et al., 2007; Cameron et al., 
2006). We stopped data collection once the pre-specified sample size was reached. 
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Materials 
Picture book. Eight pictures were developed using Storyboard That online 
software. Each image depicted two children in familiar social situations (e.g., 
playing football, at a birthday party). Separate picture books were created for boys 
and girls such that the gender of the characters always matched the gender of the 
participant (see Figure 6, panel A).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Examples of the storybook images (created at www.storyboardthat.com) 
from Study 1 (panel A) and Study 2 (panel B).  
Emotion perception scale. A 4-point scale was used to measure children’s 
perception of sadness. The four response options included ‘Okay’, ‘A little sad’, 
‘Sad’ and ‘Very sad’. Each of these options was illustrated with a basic pictorial 
depiction of that emotion (Over & Uskul, 2016; see Figure 7, panel A). 
Empathic helping measure. Children’s tendency to help the victim was 
measured by their distribution of five yellow sticker stars on two cardboard trays 
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(one belonging to the participant and one belonging to the victim of a minor 
transgression; see Figure 7, panel B). 
Figure 7. Materials: (A) the four-point scale that measured children’s ratings of 
emotion intensity, (B) the cardboard trays that were part of the helping task (note 
that the tray belonging to the participant was placed nearer to them while the one 
belonging to the victim was placed slightly further away) and (C) the ‘ruined’ 
drawing used as a prop for the emotion intensity measure in Study 1. 
Design and counterbalancing 
The main independent variables were the condition assigned in the picture 
book phase (experimental, control) and the group membership of the victims (own 
cultural group, immigrant group). This led to four between-subject conditions: 
experimental or control questions about the immigrant group in the picture book 
followed by victims belonging to that group or to the child’s own culture. The 
dependent variables were children’s perception of a novel member’s sadness and the 
number of stickers children donated to the victim in the empathic helping task. The 
order in which these two dependent measures were presented was counterbalanced.  
Procedure 
 Picture book phase. The experimenter (E) introduced children to the 
immigrant group. She showed them a picture of a group of illustrated child 
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characters (on the front of the storybook) and said ‘These children come from a 
country very far away but now they live here. They speak a different language and 
they sometimes eat different food to you. They also used to go to a school quite 
different from your school’. After the introduction, E proceeded to go through the 
eight pictures and asked children two questions for each image. In the experimental 
condition, she asked ‘What do you think the children might be feeling in this 
picture?’ followed by ‘What do you think the children might be thinking about?’ In 
the control condition, she asked ‘Where are the children in this picture?’ and then 
‘What do you think the children might be doing?’ All participants discussed the 
immigrant group in this phase. 
 Dependent measures. After the picture book phase, children were told of 
two scenarios that happened to two different individuals. In the immigrant group 
victim condition, E immediately proceeded to administer the tasks, however, in the 
condition in which the victim was from the participant’s own culture, E first 
mentioned that she would be asking about ‘children who come from your own town 
and who live close to you’. 
 For the emotion perception measure, E showed children a drawing with a 
relatively small tear in the upper left corner of the page (see Figure 7, panel C). She 
told participants that ‘a child (either from the place “far away” or from the same 
town as the participant, depending on condition) drew this picture earlier but 
someone tore some of it. They are now at home playing with their toys. How do you 
think they feel now?’ and directed the children to answer on the 4-point smiley-face 
scale (0 = Okay, 1 = A little sad, 2 = Sad, 3 = Very sad). We decided to talk about 
this transgression retrospectively to avoid the ceiling effects observed during the 
piloting of this task (see also Over & Uskul, 2016).  
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In the empathic helping measure, E said ‘I am going to see a child (again, 
from the place “far away” or from the same town as the participant) tomorrow who I 
heard had all of their stickers stolen from them.’ E then gave children five identical 
stickers and told them that, if they wanted, they could give some of their stickers to 
the victim by placing them on his or her cardboard tray. However, E also informed 
children that they could keep the stickers themselves by putting them on another tray 
that she placed on the table directly in front of the participant. Children were asked 
to identify their own and the other child’s tray and were then told that they could 
give out the stickers however they wished. E looked away at this point to give 
children some privacy when distributing the stickers.  
If a child asked about the purpose of the task again, did not correctly identify 
the trays or if they simply did not proceed to distribute the stickers, E repeated the 
instructions. Participants were excluded from the analyses if they still explicitly said 
that they did not understand the task or if they failed to correctly identify the trays 
after the second explanation. If a child just simply did not engage in the task at this 
point, E prompted them one more time (‘Go ahead and give out the stickers’). 
Children who did not complete the task following the final prompt were also 
excluded.  
Coding 
The children’s responses on the emotion intensity measure could range 
between 0 (Okay) and 3 (Very sad) and the number of stickers they donated for the 
helping measure could range between 0 and 5. Children’s performance on both of 
these tasks was coded directly from the videos. A second researcher, unaware of the 
hypotheses of the study, recoded 100% of the data. The two raters only disagreed on 
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one participant’s response on the emotion and helping measures meaning they 
agreed in 98.96% of cases. The two disagreements were resolved through discussion.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
As a manipulation check, we coded the number of mental state words 
children used in response to the test questions during the picture book phase (for e.g., 
how often they used terms like ‘to try’, ‘to be happy’ and ‘to remember’). A between 
subjects t-test confirmed that children produced significantly more mental state 
words in the experimental condition (M = 18.94, SD = 11.30) compared to the 
control (M = 1.50, SD = 2.54), t(51.72) = 10.43, p < .001 (the degrees of freedom 
were modified because the assumption for equality of variances was violated). 
The order in which the tasks were administered, the gender of the child and 
the age of the child had no significant effect on the dependent measures (all p’s > 
.119.). As a result, we collapsed across theses variables and do not consider them 
further.  
Emotion perception  
A 2 (Condition: Experimental, control) × 2 (Group membership of victim: 
Own cultural group, immigrant group) between-subjects ANOVA revealed that 
children viewed the victim as equally sad regardless of whether they heard the 
mentalising prompts (M = 1.50, SD = 1.32) or the control prompts (M = 1.46, SD = 
1.34; F(1, 92) = .02, p = .879). In both conditions, children viewed the victim as 
somewhat sad. There was also no main effect of the victim’s group membership 
(F(1, 92) = .21, p = .649) and no significant interaction between these variables (F(1, 
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92) = .21, p = .649). Therefore, it seems that the experimental manipulation did not 
affect children’s perception of a basic negative emotion experienced by a novel 
group member.   
Empathic helping 
A 2 (Condition: Experimental, control) × 2 (Group membership of victim: 
Own cultural group, immigrant group) between-subjects ANOVA on children’s 
helping behaviour showed that the experimental manipulation had a significant 
influence over their tendency to donate stickers to the individual in distress. More 
specifically, there was a significant interaction between condition and group 
membership of the victim, F (1, 92) = 8.81, p = .004, partial η2 = .09. Children who 
were encouraged to attribute mental states to the immigrant group donated more 
stickers to a victim from this group (M = 1.79, SD = 1.35) than the children in the 
control condition (M = .79, SD = 1.14), t(46) = 2.77, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .80 
(moderate to large effect size). However, there was no difference between conditions 
in the extent to which children helped a victim from their own town (t(46) = 1.49, p 
= .144; see Figure 8, panel A). These results imply that the effects of mentalising 
about an immigrant group do not generalise across the boundaries of this group 
dimension. There was no main effect of picture book condition (F(1, 92) = .61, p = 
.437) or the group membership of the victim (F(1, 92) = .10, p = .755). 
Study 2 
Our main aim for Study 2 was to investigate whether we could replicate the 
observed increase in children’s empathic helping for an immigrant group member. 
Furthermore, since the mentalising manipulation did not alter children’s perception 
of a basic emotion (sadness), we wanted to examine if it could impact on children’s 
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judgement of a secondary emotion (disappointment). This modification was based on 
previous literature suggesting that both children and adults are more likely to 
perceive differences in how in- and outgroup members experience uniquely human 
emotions than in how they experience or express primary emotions (Leyens et al., 
2000; Martin et al., 2008). We also added a third character to each image in the 
picture book. We reasoned that a slightly more complex social situation with three 
characters might lead children to engage in more conversation about mental states 
and so increase the strength of the observed effect.   
Method  
Participants 
We recruited 96 5-year-olds (48 boys, Mage =, age range = 5 years 0 months-
5 years 11 months) from local schools and a museum. Twelve more children were 
tested but then excluded for failing to understand the sticker distribution task (n = 7), 
not completing the task (n = 4) and for misunderstanding the experimental test 
questions (n = 1). As in Study 1, participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
four conditions.  
Materials 
Picture book. Similar to Study 1, children were presented with eight pictures 
developed using Storyboard That online software. In contrast to the picture book 
used in Study 1, each image depicted three children (see Figure 6, panel B).  
 Emotion perception scale. The same 4-point scale was used to measure 
children’s perception of disappointment.  In this study, the four options represented 
‘Okay’,  ‘A little disappointed’, ‘Disappointed’ and ‘Very disappointed’. To ensure 
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that children in this age range understood the meaning of the word ‘disappointment’, 
we conducted a small pilot with six children prior to running the main study (2 boys, 
Mage = 5 years 6 months, age range = 5 years 2 months - 5 years 11 months). 
Participants were presented with three images (also created with using Storyboard 
That software) in which one child could be thought of as experiencing this emotion. 
For example, one character was winning a race and smiling while the other was 
losing the race and frowning. For each picture, we asked children to identify the 
character that they thought was disappointed. Children’s performance was at 100%.  
Empathic helping measure. In Study 1, children’s helping levels were quite 
low. To try to encourage greater helping overall, children were given slightly less 
attractive stickers to distribute for the helping task (i.e., five yellow circles as 
opposed to yellow stars) on the same trays used in Study 1. 
Design and counterbalancing 
As in Study 1, the independent variables were the condition associated with 
the picture book (experimental, control) and the group membership of the victims 
(own cultural group, immigrant group). The dependent variables were children’s 
ratings of disappointment and the number of stickers they chose to donate to the 
victim. Again, the order in which these two dependent measures were presented was 
counterbalanced.  
Procedure 
 The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that of Study 1 except for the 
emotion intensity measure. For this task, E told children that ‘a child (either from the 
place “far away” or from the same town as the participant, again, depending on 
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condition) wanted to colour after school, but someone broke their colouring set. 
They are now at home playing with their toys’ and then presented children with the 
4-point scale so they could rate how this child felt (0 = Okay, 1 = A little 
disappointed, 2 = Disappointed, 3 = Very disappointed).   
Coding 
 Children’s responses were coded in the same way as in Study 1. A second 
rater, unaware of the hypotheses of the study, recoded 100% of the data. Agreement 
between coders was perfect for emotion perception scores (matched on 100% of 
trials) and very high for empathy scores (matched on 96.88% of trials). The few 
inconsistent trials in the latter measure were discussed between coders.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses 
   Like in Study 1, the experimental test questions led children to produce more 
mental state words (M = 16.15, SD = 10.88) than did the control questions (M = 
1.23, SD = 1.81), t(49.61) = 9.37, p < .001 (again, the degrees of freedom were 
modified due to the violation of the assumption of equal variance). There was no 
effect of the counterbalancing variable (all p’s >.145) or gender (all p’s > .054) on 
the children’s responses.   
Emotion perception 
A 2 (Condition: Experimental, control) × 2 (Group membership of victim: 
Own cultural group, immigrant group) between-subjects ANOVA revealed no 
significant effect of condition although children’s perception of how disappointed 
the victim felt was slightly higher after the experimental manipulation (M = 1.96, SD 
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= 1.30) than the control manipulation (M = 1.48, SD = 1.32), F (1, 92) = 3.14, p = 
.080, partial η2 = .03.  Overall, participants viewed the individual as moderately 
disappointed in both conditions. There was no main effect of group membership of 
the victim (F(1, 92) = .15, p = .701), nor was there an interaction between these 
variables (F(1, 92) = .05, p = .818). Thus, prompting children to talk about the 
mental states of immigrant group members does not impact upon their perception of 
a primary (Study 1) or secondary negative emotion (the present study) a victim 
experienced after a minor transgression.  
Empathic helping 
A 2 (Condition: Experimental, control) × 2 (Group membership of victim: 
Own cultural group, immigrant group) between-subjects ANOVA on empathic 
helping scores yielded a marginal main effect of condition, F (1, 92) = 3.81, p = 
.054, partial η2 = .04. On average, children gave somewhat more stickers to the 
victim in the experimental picture book condition (M = 1.46, SD = 1.25) than in the 
control (M = .98, SD = 1.19). There was no main effect of the group membership of 
the victim (F(1, 92) = .87, p = .353).  Replicating the main result from Study 1, there 
was a significant interaction between condition and group membership of the victim, 
F (1, 92) = 4.50, p = .037, partial η2 = .05. Follow-up tests showed that children 
were more helpful towards the immigrant group victim after mentalising about that 
group (M = 1.83, SD = 1.24) than after describing their actions (M = .83, SD = 1.13), 
t(46) = 2.92, p = .005, Cohen’s d = .84 (moderate to large effect size). There was 
again no difference between conditions in children’s helping behaviour towards the 
victim from their own culture (t(46) = -1.18, p = .906; see Figure 8, panel B). Again, 
these findings suggest that, in this specific intergroup context, mentalising about a 
perceived outgroup may only have benefits for a victim belonging to this group. 
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Figure 8. The results from Study 1 (panel A) and Study 2 (panel B) for the mean 
number of stickers that children donated to the victim. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean. 
General Discussion 
These two studies show that encouraging children to discuss the mental states 
of a perceived outgroup leads to increased empathic helping towards a novel member 
of that group. Our research contributes to understanding the role that mental state 
attribution has in shaping intergroup interactions. Previous research has 
demonstrated that children in this age range use mental state terms more often when 
describing the interactions of social ingroup members compared to outgroup 
members (McLoughlin & Over, 2017). The present studies suggest that the 
attribution of mental states plays a causal role in eliciting prosocial behaviour within 
intergroup settings. This finding aligns with other developmental research that found 
thinking about the experience of an individual in a difficult situation fosters a greater 
willingness to help them (Sierksma et al., 2015). It extends this work by showing 
that motivating children to mentalise about another group more generally increases 
empathic helping towards other members of that group in an unrelated situation.  
It is interesting to note that attributing mental states to an outgroup did not 
affect children’s prosocial responding towards their own cultural group. This result is 
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compatible with the findings of Shih et al. (2009) who reported that adopting the 
perspective of an Asian individual increased the likelihood that a sample of mostly 
White adults would help an Asian confederate, but not a White confederate, who 
‘dropped’ their keys on the floor. Taken together, these results illustrate that the 
positive effects of mentalising about a group may not transfer across group 
boundaries. From a more applied perspective, they indicate that interventions 
designed to encourage mentalising about outgroups do not necessarily risk 
discouraging prosociality towards ingroup members, at least in this particular 
context.  
We did not find any evidence that prompting children to think about the 
mental states of outgroup members influenced their attribution of emotions to a 
subsequent victim of minor harm. Our mentalising manipulation had no effect on 
children’s perception of a victim’s sadness (Study 1) or disappointment (Study 2). 
This suggests the interesting possibility that the observed increase in helping 
behaviour was not driven by a change in children’s understanding of the victim’s 
emotions but rather by an increased motivation to assist them.  However, further 
research is needed to test this question more directly.   
Another important route for future work is to explore whether certain types of 
mentalising exert a more powerful influence over prosocial behaviour than do others. 
When asked to talk about the thoughts and feelings of members belonging to an 
immigrant group, children in our study referenced a range of mental states including 
happiness, anger, desire, confusion and surprise. Drawing sharp distinctions between 
different types of mental states is not straightforward and researchers disagree on 
how this ought to be done (McLoughlin & Over, 2017; Meins et al., 2013). Yet, it 
would still be worthwhile for future research to assess whether the observed effect is 
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driven more by a specific aspect of mentalising (e.g., emotions vs. decisions) or 
whether the complexity of the terms that are produced during this process matters 
(e.g., primary vs. secondary emotions or intentions vs. beliefs). 
 Our results could ultimately have implications for research-led interventions 
to promote positive intergroup behaviour. We found that a relatively short 
mentalising manipulation was sufficient to significantly increase the level of helping 
children showed towards an immigrant group victim and that this manipulation 
produced a medium to large effect size. The road to intervention is, however, a long 
one. Before incorporating this approach into interventions, it is vital to examine the 
length of the observed effects and if they generalise to more ecologically valid 
situations, as well as to different cultural and intergroup contexts. Another important 
question is whether this effect will have any influence over and above existing 
effective interventions that focus on vicarious contact with outgroup members 
(Brown et al., 2007; Cameron et al., 2006; Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi, & Giovannini, 
2012). Finally, it will be crucial to investigate the prospect that encouraging children 
to mentalise about an outgroup can sometimes have adverse effects, for example, 
when the group in question is perceived as a potential threat (Hackel et al., 2014).  
Overall, our research offers a promising technique for strategies focused on 
enhancing intergroup harmony in young children. When asked to reflect on the 
mental states of an immigrant group, they were more likely to help another 
immigrant child who was a victim of an unfair life event. Thus, this line of research 
could be potentially valuable in increasing aid towards vulnerable social groups in 
Western societies and beyond.   
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Chapter 5: General Thesis Discussion 
The present empirical studies reveal some interesting, and potentially 
important, findings for the developmental origins of dehumanising biases. In Chapter 
2, 6-year-old, but not 5-year-old, children perceived less humanness in faces that 
belonged to their gender outgroup (Study 1) and to a geographically based outgroup 
(Study 2). The developmental pattern of children’s responses was very similar in 
both of these intergroup contexts; the tendency to judge outgroup faces to be less 
human relative to ingroup faces increased gradually between the ages of 5 and 6 and 
was not related to children’s preference for the social groups. The results from 
Chapter 3 also suggest that young children may not be inclined to consider the 
humanity of in- and outgroup members to the same extent. In this study, 5- and 6-
year-old children spontaneously referred to mental states more often when describing 
the actions of ingroup characters compared to characters belonging to a different 
group. Moreover, 6-year-olds provided a more detailed description of their own 
group’s mental states. These findings held across two types of social categorisation 
(gender and geographically based) and even in an analysis that controlled for the 
number of words children spoke overall. Lastly, Chapter 4 showed that directly 
addressing this bias in mental state attribution can have positive outcomes for 
children’s intergroup behaviour. In two studies, children who were encouraged to 
mentalise about the behaviour of immigrant group members (through discussion of 
their thoughts and feelings) were more helpful towards a novel member of that group 
who was the victim of a minor transgression.  
 This work offers insight into how children may perceive outgroups as less  
human and identifies a possible strategy that could combat a negative consequence 
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of this phenomenon. However, given that the concept of dehumanisation has only 
recently been investigated from a developmental perspective, there are a great many 
questions that need to be explored in future research. Thus, in the following sections, 
I will discuss the implications of my doctoral studies for this and related topics, and 
what I consider to be particularly important routes for future work.  
The Nature and Trajectory of Dehumanisation in Development 
 The first question concerns the appearance of dehumanising tendencies in 
development. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examined two proposed forms of 
dehumanisation, one relating to biases in the way we perceive physical humanness 
(Castano et al., 2009; Hackel et al., 2014; Krumhuber et al., 2015) and the other 
relating to the denial of mind to other people (Gray & Wegner, 2009; Harris & Fiske, 
2011). The results of these studies were complementary in some respects but also 
produced some interesting differences. Most notably, 5-year-old children perceived 
in- and outgroup faces as equally human in Chapter 2 whereas similarly aged 
children in Chapter 3 were more likely to attribute mental states to their own versus 
another social group. The apparent discrepancy in the emergence of this bias raises 
important questions regarding the nature of dehumanisation in a developmental 
context, such as how this phenomenon should be operationalised. 
Defining Dehumanisation 
All of the previous research on this topic has either implied or explicitly 
stated that children must first understand what it means to be human before they are 
able to engage in dehumanising thought (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Martin et al., 
2008; Van Noorden et al., 2014). For example, Chas et al. (2015) reasoned that 
recruiting older children (11- to 12-year-olds) was necessary for the study of 
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infrahumanisation because some researchers have argued that the understanding of 
secondary emotions is not reliably observed until about this age (Bennett, 1989; 
Harris et al., 1987; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). This may be a true prerequisite for 
dehumanising another person but, if this is so, then the developmental trends of this 
harmful phenomenon would vary depending on the definition that is adopted. 
Let’s look at this dilemma in the context of mental state attribution. Some 
psychological theories exclusively conceptualise dehumanisation as the failure to 
consider the mental life of outgroup members (Fiske, 2009; Majdandžić et al., 2012; 
Waytz et al., 2010). Relevant developmental research has shown that infants and 
young children are able to infer the minds of other people (Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Tomasello, 1995) and demonstrate discriminatory 
behaviour towards outgroup members (Over, 2018; Richter et al., 2016). Therefore, 
it could be that children show signs of this tendency before they can explicitly reason 
about the traits that are considered uniquely human. Alternatively, it could be that, 
contrary to these mind-related accounts, the denial of mental states is not the sole 
factor involved in considering a person to be less human.  
 I have discussed the relationship between dehumanisation and mental state 
attribution throughout my empirical work (most prominently in Chapters 2 and 3) 
but I believe it is important I take the opportunity to reflect on the role that mental 
states may play in children’s dehumanising biases. On one hand, there are situations 
in which denying the mind of another person and thinking of them as unhuman do 
not co-occur. Research examining how adults perceive the minds of others on the 
continua of agency (i.e., the ability to act of one’s own accord) and experience (i.e., 
the ability to sense and to feel) show that babies are considered to have less of a 
mind (Gray et al., 2007), yet, they are presumably not seen as inherently less human 
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compared to other ingroup members (Smith, 2012). Furthermore, there is no 
evidence to suggest that individuals who find it more difficult to understand the 
mental states of others (e.g., in autism; Baron-Cohen, 2000) are more likely to 
dehumanise them. In addition, recent research suggests that the ability to 
contemplate the minds of other beings is not  uniquely human (Buttelmann, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2017; Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2016) - great apes show a form of false belief understanding.  
On the other hand, it may be that (similar to work on infrahumanisation) the 
complexity of the mental states that are attributed matter, for example, basic 
intentions versus more abstract reasoning skills. Taking both cases into account, it is 
not evident whether children’s biases in attributing mental state to group members 
shown in Chapter 3 is an illustration of dehumanisation per se. Pinning down the 
exact role mental state attribution has in young children’s dehumanising perceptions 
is an imperative aim for future endeavours and perhaps for how this phenomenon 
should be conceptualised in general.   
Dehumanisation and Preference 
 An interesting finding in Chapter 2 was that the gradual increase in the 
relative dehumanisation of outgroup faces was not associated with the participants’ 
preference for their ingroup versus their outgroup. This result was initially surprising 
because previous research with adults suggest that humanised targets are generally 
more liked than dehumanised targets (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Harris & Fiske, 
2007; Kozak et al., 2006; Vaes & Paladino, 2009). However, further inspection of 
the literature provided some compelling explanations for why these attitudes were 
not correlated. One possibility is that because our dehumanisation measure captured 
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discrete perceptions of humanness, the subsequent results were a reflection of an 
implicit form of prejudice (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Research employing 
measures of children’s explicit and implicit attitudes has shown that they are rarely 
empirically related (Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2013) which may be because 
explicit biases peak and then steadily decline across development (due to the 
influence of social norms) while implicit biases remain stable through to adulthood  
(Banaji et al., 2008; Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). Hence, our measures of 
dehumanisation and preference might still tap into respective implicit and explicit 
elements of the same construct of social bias. 
A more probable explanation (explored in the General Discussion of Chapter 
2) is that dehumanisation is a completely separable process and not reducible to 
basic preference. Other studies on related concepts in children (e.g., essentialism, 
pain perception) have similarly found no associations with explicit liking (Dore et 
al., 2014; Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, & Cimpian, 2017) and work with 
adults revealed that ingroup preference occurs when groups are based on random 
assignment but participants do not infra-humanise the outgroup in that context. 
Relatedly, it could be that the origins of dehumanisation are uniquely associated with 
the development of outgroup negativity and not ingroup favouritism. In other words, 
dehumanisation could be conceived as the flipside of the ‘like me’ hypothesis of 
social affiliation (Meltzoff, 2007). This idea is supported to some extent by the 
observation that dehumanising metaphors (e.g., comparisons to 'rats' and 'beasts'; 
Jahoda, 1999; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015) are inherently designed to 
create explicitly negative beliefs about outgroup members (e.g., that they are 
'disgusting' or 'dangerous'; Buckels & Trapnell, 2013; Smith, 2012; Tirrell, 2012). 
Moreover, the developmental change in children’s responses in Chapter 2 has a 
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similar trajectory to the emergence of outgroup derogation seen in previous work 
(Aboud, 2003; Buttelmann & Böhm, 2014). Further research is required to clarify 
the associations between preference, explicit negativity and dehumanisation in 
development. 
Dehumanisation and Essentialism 
To my knowledge, social essentialism - the belief that the expression of a 
social group’s traits and behaviour relies on a shared, underlying ‘essence’ (Allport, 
1954; Gelman, 2004) - has not been directly studied with relation to dehumanisation 
in young children. Leyens et al. (2000) posit that ingroup members are perceived to 
have a more human ‘essence’ than outgroup members, suggesting a relationship 
between these two concepts. David Livingstone Smith (2012) too emphasises the 
role of psychological essentialism in his philosophical account of dehumanisation in 
which he considers essentialist thought as a necessary step in dehumanising another 
person. He argues that the attribution of a ‘subhuman’ essence to others (see Smith, 
2014, for conceptual differences between and Leyens et al. (2001) ‘infra-human’ 
essence) can explain why we are able to perceive other individuals, who physically 
appear to be human, as unhuman. He defines dehumanisation as the perception that 
outgroup members lack an essential human quality and thus constitute a different, 
lower category to humans. Previous studies have shown that essentialist beliefs 
predict reduced sharing (Rhodes et al., 2017) and stereotyping (Pauker, Ambady, & 
Apfelbaum, 2010) in children. Therefore, it would be interesting to explore whether 
the conception of social groups as different essential ‘kinds’ and the perception that 
other people are more or less human interact in development.  
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A related phenomenon that could also be involved in this relationship is the 
belief that outgroup members are more homogenous in their traits compared to 
ingroup members who are considered to possess more unique, idiosyncratic traits 
(i.e., the 'outgroup homogeniety' effect; Quattrone & Jones, 1980; Simon, 1992). For 
instance, Smith (2012) specifies that the subhuman view of a social group extends to 
every member of that group. There is some evidence that children exhibit this 
tendency (Bennett et al., 2004; McGlothlin & Killen, 2005; McGlothlin, Killen, & 
Edmonds, 2005) but its origins have been relatively understudied.  
Dehumanisation and Status  
Similarly to essentialism, I did not explore the role social status may play in 
children’s dehumanising biases in my doctoral studies. Researchers from several 
different traditions argue that perceived lower status is integral to perceiving some 
groups as less human than others (Capozza et al., 2011; Fiske, 2009; Kteily et al., 
2015; Viki & Calitri, 2008). Livingstone Smith (2012) states that dehumanised 
outgroups are not just unhuman but less than human and, in a recent advance on the 
study of blatant dehumanisation, Kteily et al. (2015) propose the belief  some groups 
are ‘less evolved’ than others is a consistent predictor of discriminatory outgroup 
attitudes (e.g., support for punitive anti-Muslim policies). 
This begs the question – when, if ever, are individuals belonging to high 
status groups vulnerable to dehumanising perceptions? Interestingly, in their 
theorising about the infrahumanisation effect, Leyens et al. (2001) suggest both 
majority and minority groups are more likely to believe ingroup members experience 
secondary emotions. Empirical support for this assumption has been mixed thus far 
with some cross-cultural work on infrahumanisation finding no influence of  status 
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(Rodríguez Pérez et al., 2011) and other studies showing that less stereotypically 
competent outgroups are infrahumanised to a greater degree (Vaes & Paladino, 
2009). Some research has illustrated that high status groups can be viewed as less 
human, but in a different way to perceived lower social classes (Andrighetto et al., 
2014). For example, Martinez et al. (2012) found that Spanish participants linked 
more animal-related words (animalistic dehumanisation) to surnames typically 
associated with a marginalised social outgroup (i.e., Gypsy community) and, in 
contrast, were more likely to link machine-related terms (mechanistic 
dehumanisation) to those commonly associated with a high status outgroup (i.e., 
German people). Longitudinal research examining the perception of in- and outgroup 
humanness amongst children from majority/high SES groups compared with those 
from minority/lower SES backgrounds could discern the impact of status on the 
nature of this phenomenon. 
Dehumanisation in Different Intergroup Contexts 
 The present results demonstrate that the developmental pattern for 
dehumanising tendencies were similar for both gender and geographically based 
groups while other work has suggested that children as young as 6 years of age think 
that national and racial outgroup members possess fewer uniquely human 
characteristics (Costello & Hodson, 2014; Martin et al., 2008). Yet, further 
investigation is needed to corroborate the emergence of dehumanisation within these 
and other intergroup dimensions, for example, across religious (Chalik et al., 2017; 
Heiphetz et al., 2013) and ethnic (Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Nesdale, Maass, 
Griffiths, & Durkin, 2003) divisions. This investigation is warranted because past 
research has shown that children prioritise group markers in their social evaluations 
(Kinzler et al., 2009; Shutts et al., 2010; Shutts et al., 2013) and that the appearance 
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of certain social biases is prevalent cross-culturally (i.e., relating to gender and 
native language; DeJesus et al., 2017a; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009; Shutts et al., 2011). Little is known, however, about whether children are more 
likely to dehumanise members of particular outgroups more than others and whether 
the development of dehumanisation differs across cultures..  
My research addressed this issue to some extent: the main effects held across 
two different social categories (Chapters 2 & 3) and, in the second study of Chapter 
2, children’s responses were influenced by the most salient group marker 
(geographic location vs. the gender of the faces) but future studies could investigate 
this research question more directly. Research with children whose social identity is 
not exclusive to one group (for e.g., mulitiracial and multilingual children;DeJesus, 
Hwang, Dautel, & Kinzler, 2017b; Gaither, 2015; Margie et al., 2005; Roberts, 
Williams, & Gelman, 2017) would also be informative for understanding the 
importance of categorisation in the origins of dehumanisation. 
  Dehumanisation in the context of gender 
It is important to mention the significance of the current findings with 
regards to previous research on the development of gender bias. I focused on gender 
because of its relevance in how young children reason about their social environment 
(Bussey & Bandura, 1999; Levy & Haaf, 1994; Martin & Ruble, 2004) and found 
that they sometimes dehumanise their gender outgroup. Although, compared to the 
other intergroup distinctions mentioned above, gender-based attitudes have a unique 
developmental trajectory. It is commonly observed that both young girls and boys 
favour members of their own gender group but that boys’ ingroup preference tends 
to weaken throughout development (Dunham et al., 2015; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2001). 
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Male adolescents and adults even favour females over other males (Dunham et al., 
2015; Eagly, Mladinic, & Otto, 1991; Fiske et al., 2002) whereas women 
consistently display ingroup positivity (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004).  
The opposite trend is seen for children’s judgements of relative status. Six-
year-old, but not 5-year-old, girls are less likely than boys to say that ingroup 
members are ‘really really smart’ (Bian et al., 2017) and children expect that more 
powerful and prestigious positions are held by males (Liben et al., 2001; Ruble, 
Martin, & Berenbaum, 2007). These findings are especially interesting when bearing 
in mind that dehumanised outgroup members are often  perceived as lower in status 
(Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008; Smith, 2012, 2014). Therefore, 
the development of dehumanisation in the context of gender needs to be paid special 
research attention. Investigating this group dynamic with relation to the warmth and 
competence dimensions of the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002) could be 
particularly useful.  
Summary and Final Thoughts 
In sum, the current findings suggest that children show dehumanising biases 
from around the age of 6; however, it is possible that younger children exhibit 
tendencies that are akin to or precipitate dehumanisation (i.e., the attribution of fewer 
mental states to outgroup members). A final, and perhaps crucial, question for future 
research in this vein concerns the nature of the developmental trajectory of 
dehumanisation itself. First, it could be that children’s perception of in- and outgroup 
humanity may always differ. In line with the “like me” account of social affiliation 
(Meltzoff, 2013), infants and young children use their own mental and physical 
experiences as a model for those of similar others and thus socially dissimilar others 
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are always perceived as qualitatively different on this dimension. Alternatively (or 
perhaps in combination with “like me” preferences), children come to dehumanise 
members of perceived outgroups over time as a consequence of social learning. The 
results from Chapter 2 provides some evidence for the latter effect – 5-year-olds 
judged in- and outgroup faces to be similarly human and the observed age 
differences were driven by a decrease in 6-year-olds’ outgroup humanness ratings. 
The testing of these hypotheses has added implications for confirming whether the 
origins of dehumanisation involve attributing elevated humanness to ingroup 
members or degrading the human status of outgroup members (Haslam et al., 2008; 
Viki & Calitri, 2008).  
If dehumanising outgroup perceptions are primarily driven by social learning 
mechanisms, it would then be vital to explore the environmental influences that 
could contribute to its development. Before discussing ideas on the cultural 
transmission of the dehumanising percept, I would like to briefly outline the 
potential implications of my doctoral studies for research areas beyond (but related 
to) the study of dehumanisation.   
Theory of Mind Research 
The majority of previous work on theory of mind has placed emphasis on 
how core social cognitive skills explain the typical (Flavell et al., 1990; Moore & 
Frye, 1991; Wellman, 2002) and atypical (Abell et al., 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Frith, 2001) development of this ability. A recent argument has highlighted the 
additional role of children’s level of social motivation in explaining the emergence 
of this skill (Over, 2016). Chevallier et al. (2012) proposes that social motivational 
deficits (e.g., less likely to orient towards and to find social cues rewarding; Dawson 
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et al., 2004; Demurie, Roeyers, Baeyens, & Sonuga-Barke, 2011) could underlie the 
social cognitive deficits observed in autism. The study in Chapter 3 provides some 
support for the importance of social motivation in children’s reasoning about the 
mental states of other people; participants were perhaps more motivated to talk about 
the mind of socially relevant agents (i.e., ingroup members). This finding does not 
rule out the possibility, however, that group differences were due to some reduced 
capacity in which the mental states of outgroup members may be trickier to simulate 
than ingroup members (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Further research is necessary to 
understand the interaction between the cognitive and motivational drives of mental 
state attribution. This line of inquiry could also enhance our general interpretation of 
dehumanising biases. Some empirical evidence has illustrated how chronically and 
situationally lonely people humanise other agents to a greater extent (Epley, Waytz, 
Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Powers, Worsham, Freeman, Wheatley, & Heatherton, 
2014), but current psychological theory has not comprehensively delineated whether 
dehumanisation is a simple cognitive bias (Fiske, 2009; Harris & Fiske, 2009; Vaes 
et al., 2003) or the result of increased motivation to see others as more or less  
human (for e.g., to permit violence; Bandura, 1999; Bar-Tal, 1989; Schwartz & 
Struch, 1989; Smith, 2012) or an amalgamation of both. 
Children’s Perception of Non-Human Agents 
In order to measure children’s subtle attribution of humanness to social group 
members, I employed stimuli that were not completely or not at all human 
(ambiguous doll-human faces in Chapter 2 and geometric shapes in Chapter 3), 
therefore, the present work has interesting implications for how children perceive 
non-human agents. Due to the ever increasing presence of modern technology (Kahn 
et al., 2011), a recent wave of research has investigated adults (Cross, Ramsey, 
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Liepelt, Prinz, & Hamilton, 2015) and children’s (Kahn et al., 2012; Woods, 
Dautenhahn, & Schulz, 2004) perception of robots. One of the key aims of this 
research involves finding ways to increase people’s comfort with robots (for e.g., see 
Asada, 2015; Tung, 2016), such that children would be willing to interact with them 
in medical and educational settings (Blanson Henkemans et al., 2013; Fridin, 2014; 
Scassellati, Henny, & Matarić, 2012). Previous research has observed that adults feel 
closer to and like a robotic agent more when it spoke in a same-gender voice (Eyssel, 
Ruiter, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, & Hegel, 2012) while the findings in Chapters 2 
and 3 suggest children humanise agents who have been denoted as ingroup members. 
Thus, it is possible that attributing robots with ingroup characteristics could help 
children to be more tolerant of these entities in their everyday lives. 
On the whole, it is important to consider the theoretical links between work 
on the development of anthropomorphic and dehumanising thought (Waytz et al., 
2010). Children anthropomorphise other beings (e.g., animals) to a greater extent 
than do adults (Severson & Lemm, 2016) but they are still careful to discriminate 
between the moral standing afforded to humans and non-human agents. For example, 
9-year-olds believed an interactive robot deserves fair treatment and should be 
protected from harm but should not have other civil entitlements, like the right to 
vote or to be compensated for performed work (Kahn et al., 2012). This 
discriminatory view of humanness could perhaps be equated to the subtle 
dehumanisation of outgroup members, who benefit from some human privileges but 
not all. 
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The Cultural Transmission of Dehumanisation 
As mentioned above, the fact that only older children in Chapter 2 perceived 
less humanness in outgroup faces lends support to the assumption that 
dehumanisation is an acquired bias. The power of imagery and language to 
disseminate and to exacerbate dehumanising perceptions has been documented 
throughout history (Bytwerk, 1983; O'Brien, 2003; Smith, 2012; Tirrell, 2012; 
Zimbardo, 2007) and highlighted in recent portrayals of immigrant groups (Bleiker, 
Campbell, Hutchison, & Nicholson, 2013; Esses et al., 2013; Shah, 2015; Vaes, 
Latrofa, Suitner, & Arcuri, 2017). It is not known whether the differences in the way 
adults talk about in- and outgroup members (Harris & Fiske, 2011; Moscatelli, 
Albarello, & Rubini, 2008; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb, & Diesendruck, 2015) can 
induce relative dehumanisation in young children. Other developmental research has 
shown that parents’ use of generic language (e.g., “girls wear pink” vs. “the girl 
wears pink”) can lead to an increase in children’s essentialist beliefs about real-life 
and novel groups (Gelman, Taylor, Nguyen, Leaper, & Bigler, 2004; Rhodes et al., 
2012). Similarly, in a phenomenon known as the ‘linguistic intergroup bias’, adults 
and older children tendency to describe the positive actions of ingroup members and 
the negative actions of outgroup members to a higher degree of abstraction (Maass, 
Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989; Werkman, Wigboldus, & Semin, 1999) can promote 
positive ingroup stereotypes and negative outgroup stereotypes (Maass, 1999).  
Future work should concentrate on whether implicit differences exist in 
adults’ expression of in- and outgroup humanity (e.g., use of complex vs. basic 
mental state verbs) during their interactions with children and investigate the 
consequences this type of input may have for the attitudes of young observers. 
Focusing on parent-child interactions is particularly beneficial given the importance 
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of parental testimony in how children learn about social and cognitive concepts 
(Harris, 2015) and the potential implications for home-based interventions. On 
another note, it has been recently suggested that young children are not just passive 
recipients of social information but can also actively seek out biased accounts of 
group behaviour (Over et al., 2017). Certainly, Chapter 2 demonstrated that they are 
more likely to refer to the mind of ingroup members in their spontaneous 
descriptions - it is possible then that dehumanising biases could be spread within 
children’s own social networks.       
Reducing Prejudice 
In Chapter 4, the participants who were encouraged to talk about the mental 
states of immigrant outgroup members were more helpful towards another member 
of that group in a situation of need. Prompting children to reflect on the emotions 
and thoughts of others could therefore combat a potentially damaging behaviour that 
is intimately connected to dehumanisation (Andrighetto et al., 2014; Čehajić et al., 
2009; Cuddy et al., 2007). Future investigation would need to test the 
generalisability of this strategy (it did not affect children’s emotion perception and 
did not transfer across group boundaries in this case) and to extend its application to 
the problems that children face in their social lives. For instance, components of 
dehumanisation have been empirically linked to incidents of bullying (Menesini et 
al., 2003; Obermann, 2011; Pozzoli, Gini, & Vieno, 2012) and the experience of 
social ostracism (Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 2011; Harris & Fiske, 2009).  
With regards to prejudice and discrimination more generally, Haslam and 
Loughnan (2014) acknowledge that the reduction of dehumanisation has received 
modest research attention. There is some evidence that intergroup contact can reduce 
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dehumanising perceptions in adults (Capozza, Trifiletti, Vezzali, & Favara, 2013; 
Tam et al., 2007) and older children (Brown et al., 2007; Vezzali et al., 2012). 
Vezzali et al. (2012) found that increased imagined contact with immigrant children 
had a positive indirect effect, through levels of outgroup trust, on 9-year-olds’ 
attribution of uniquely human emotions. Another approach with adults that has 
provided some successful results is pointing out a common identity among groups 
such as a national group identity for rival geographically based groups (Capozza et 
al., 2013) and even a superordinate human identity (Albarello & Rubini, 2012). It 
would be interesting to examine the relative efficacy of all of these approaches on 
children’s attitudes and behaviour.  
There remains, however, a demand for further techniques to reduce 
dehumanisation and, in particular,  investigation into the appearance and reduction of 
this bias in non-WEIRD cultures should become a priority (Henrich et al., 2010). 
The findings in Chapter 4 offer a potential route to tackle the negative effects of 
dehumanisation before they become deeply entrenched. Yet, the denial of mental 
states is only one aspect of this complex social phenomenon (Smith, 2012) and may 
not be as integral in explaining the behaviour of other people within certain non-
WEIRD societies (Lillard, 1998). It is thus critical that future studies explore 
whether the humanity of perceived outgroups can be reinforced via more universally 
appropriate methods. 
Conclusion 
Dehumanisation continues to be a pervasive social problem. For example, 
throughout Western Europe and the US, media and political campaigns have often 
explicitly questioned the human status of immigrant groups. The detrimental 
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outcomes of undermining a person’s humanity have, too, been recently stressed by 
activists in the Black Lives Matter movement. This phenomenon is treated as an 
important issue in social psychology (Bain, Vaes, & Leyens, 2014; Bandura, 1991; 
Kelman, 1973; Kteily et al., 2015) philosophy (Rorty, 1993; Smith, 2014; Tirrell, 
2012) and in its implications for social policy (Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 
2008). I hope the research presented in my doctoral thesis represents some of the 
ways developmental psychology can contribute to our understanding of 
dehumanisation and urges future inquiry into the origins of this harmful social bias.  
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